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CASE NOTES
Antitrust-Price Maintenance Through Refusal To Sell.-The United
States Government sought an injunction under Section 4 of the Sherman AntiTrust Act' against defendant drug manufacturer, alleging that defendant conspired and combined with retail and wholesale druggists in a particular area2
to maintain the wholesale and retail prices of its pharmaceutical products in
violation of sections 13 and 3- of the act. The violation was alleged to have
occurred when there was no fair trade law in effect in the area.5 The United
States district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that "the actions
of defendant were properly unilateral and sanctioned by law under the doctrine
laid down in the case of United States v. Colgate & Co.
... On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed, three justices dissenting. 'Where a manufacturer,
embarking on a program to promote compliance with its suggested retail prices,
refuses to deal with wholesalers in order to elicit their cooperation in denying its
products to retailers who disregard such prices, the manufacturer is the
organizer of a price maintenance combination or conspiracy in violation of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 7 United States v. Pake,Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960).
1. "The several district courts of the United States are invested with jurdiction to
prevent and restrain violations of... [this act;] and it shall be the duty of the several
United States attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney
General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and reatrain such violations...
26 Stat. 209 (190), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1953).
2. Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Va.
3. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwivis, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or v.ith fordgn nations, is declared
to be illegal.... Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared ... to be illegal shall be demed guilty of a misdemeanor. . . ." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 t195S).
4. "Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherv.Le, or conspiracy, in rcztraint
of trade or commerce in . . . the District of Columbia, or in reztraint of trade or commerce ... between the District of Columbia and any State or States or fordgn nationc,
is declared illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or cngage in any such
combination or conspiracy, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.. .. " 26 Stat. 209
(1S90), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1953).
5. In those states where fair trade laws have been enacted, the ilker-Tydng3 Act, 50
Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (195S), and the MlcGuire Act, 65 Stat. 631 (1952), 15
U.S.C. § 45 (195S), exempt from the operation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat.
209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (195S), contracts prescribing minimum prices for the Eale and
resale of commodities identified by a trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor and which are in free and open competition with commodities of the same gecnral
class produced by others. See generally Comment, A Symposium on the Fair Trade Laws, 27
Fordham L. Rev. 63 (1958).
6. 164 F. Supp. S27, S29 (D.D.C. 195S).
7. In the instant case, the Court held that Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), which provides
that "findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly irroneous," had no application
here as the district court based its findings on a misinterpretation of the l-al standards
to be applied.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

"Scrutiny of the opinion will reveal that the Court has done no less than
send to its demise the Colgate doctrine which has been a basic part of antitrust
law concepts since it was first announced in 1919 ....
,,8 These words were
stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, as the Court in the instant case attempted to settle a controversy which began four decades ago. Because the
scope of United States v. Colgate & Co. remained unsettled then, the present
conflict arose. The Court had never undertaken to define the exact limits of
the broadly announced Colgate rule.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,10 the Court invalidated a system of written contracts by which a manufacturer attempted to
control the resale prices of his wholesale and retail distributors. The Dr. Miles
decision was distinguished in Colgate. In Colgate, the Court dismissed an indictment charging defendant with violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
because it failed to allege whether defendant entered into any agreements, express or implied, with its dealers compelling them to maintain minimum resale
prices. The Court stated that in the absence of any intent to create or maintain
a monopoly, the Sherman Act does not prevent a manufacturer engaged in
private business from announcing in advance the prices at which his goods
may be resold and refusing to deal with wholesalers and retailers who do not
conform to such prices. The manufacturer has "the unquestioned right to stop
dealing with a wholesaler for reasons sufficient to himself, and may do so
because he thinks such dealer is acting unfairly in trying to undermine his
trade.""
In FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,' 2 the next significant case,18 while paying
due respect to the Colgate rule, the Court stated that a manufacturer "may
not, consistently with the act, go beyond the exercise of this right, and by
contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly hinder or obstruct the
free and natural flow of commerce in the channels of interstate trade."' 14 Actually, the Beech-Nut decision indirectly challenged not only the scope but also
the validity of the Colgate rule because, outside of a minor detail, 1 the "BeechNut policy," designed to maintain minimum resale prices, was substantially the
8.
9.
10.

362 U.S. at 49.
250 U.S. 300 (1919).
220 U.S. 373 (1911).

11. 250 U.S. at 307, quoting Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United
States, 234 U.S. 600, 614 (1914).
12.

257 U.S. 441 (1922).

13. In the interim, the Court, in United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85
(1920), reversed a lower court judge who went so far as to say that Colgate overruled
Dr. Miles. Then, in Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 .U.S. 208 (1921), the
Court made it clear that Dr. Miles was still the law and that a combination or conspiracy
could be implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances.
14. 257 U.S. at 453.
15. The manufacturer in Beech-Nut used a special number and symbol marking system
in order to trace goods sold by a "price-cutter." For a detailed analysis of the manufacturer's activities in both the Colgate and Beech-Nut cases, see Dunn, Resale Price
Maintenance, 32 Yale L.J. 676 (1923).
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same as the plan adopted by the defendant in Colgate. Present in the policies
of the manufacturers in both cases was an issuance of letters, circulars, and
price lists to wholesale and retail dealers suggesting resale prices; an insistence
upon adherence to the prices under threat of refusal to deal; a request to these
dealers to cooperate and report instances of price-cutting by other dealers; the
use of agents to police the dealers in order to detect price-cutting; the placing
of rebellious dealers on suspended lists; a refusal to sell to dealers who would
not maintain suggested prices or who would sell to others not maintaining them;
and a reinstatement of offending dealers when an assurance was given that they
would adhere to the prices in the future.
In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,y0 perhaps the only case in
point since Beech-Nut, the Court again penalized activity involving price-fixing
outside the Colgate rule. There the defendant compelled its retailers to enter
into so-called "license agreements," which, among other restrictions, fixed resale
prices for defendant's products. In addition, defendant exerted control over a
majority of its wholesalers by refusing to deal with them unless they would
agree to sell only to those retailers who were "licensed" and at prices fixed by
the defendant.
In the present case, the manufacturer published suggested minimum resale
prices in catalogues sent to both its wholesale and retail dealers. There was no
system for maintaining minimum prices such as that established by the manufacturer in the Colgate and Beech-Nut cases. Defendant did not, for example,
regularly "shop" stores, maintain card index files, or in any manner police its
dealers; nor was there any evidence that it sought or obtained the cooperation
of its wholesalers and retailers in reporting or policing deviations from the
minimum price schedules. The defendant first learned of the price-cutting in
question through its own salesmen. Acting under advice of counsel,1 7 defendant
informed the wholesalers that it would refuse to sell to them if they failed to
adhere to the announced prices or if they sold defendant's products to retailers
who did not observe the suggested minimum prices. Defendant spoke to each
wholesaler individually. Each was informed, however, that the competing
wholesalers were being apprised of defendant's policy. Without exception, the
wholesalers were willing to acquiesce in this policy. In a similar manner, defendant announced the same policy to its retailers. Some of the retailers, however, refused to comply. Consequently, the unwilling retailers, whether dealing
directly with the defendant or purchasing defendant's products from wholesalers, had their supply of18goods cut off. The instant decision was based upon
these and additional facts.
The majority detailed the history of the Colgate formula. While conceding
16. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
17. 362 U.S. at 33.
1M. Because of the inventory on hand, the five retailers cut ofi by the defendant were
able to continue selling Parke Davis products. These goods were also Eold below the Euggested minimum resale prices. When complaints were received, Parke Davis rought to reduce the harm by agreeing to deal with these retailers on condition that they &-lcontinue
advertising the cut-rate prices. The Court also found this phase of the manufactures
conduct to be beyond that allowed by the "Colgate doctrine.'
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the accuracy of the essential holding in the Colgate case, the Court reasoned
that "subsequent decisions of this Court compel the holding that what Parke
Davis did here . . . went beyond mere customer selection and created combinations or conspiracies to enforce resale price maintenance .... -1 The Court
argued that the Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb Co. cases "plainly fashioned"
the dimensions of the Colgate rule "as meaning no more than that a simple
refusal to sell to customers who will not
resell at prices suggested by the seller
' 20
is permissible under the Sherman Act."
Exception must be taken to the Court's treatment of Bausch & Lomb.
There the defendant's activity in exerting a control over its products, including
resale prices, was far more extensive and intensive than that of the manufacturer in Colgate, Beech-Nut, or the principal case. Unlike the instant case,
Bausch & Lomb was a clear example of the bilateral type of price-fixing which
is abhorred by Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
As for Beech-Nut, although the Court there did limit the Colgate rule, it
cannot be said that the question of its scope was clarified. Beech-Nut left
what might be described as a gray area within which existed a shadowy line
separating the legal use of a refusal to deal from an illegal use. Beech-Nut
further complicated the situation because it not only limited the Colgate rule
but also denuded the latter decision of its facts. The principal decision has
drawn the line. It may now be said that the "Colgate doctrine" means nothing
more than that a vendor has a basic but bare right of refusal to deal in order
to maintain resale prices.
Despite the vigorous dissent 2' in the instant case, it is not true that the
decision has stripped the Colgate rule of all its validity and forcefulness. The
fundamental concept of Colgate, that a vendor in business for himself can
refuse to deal with anyone not to his liking, still remains. More specifically,
as applied to resale price maintenance, Colgate means that a vendor, when
dealing directly either at the wholesale or retail level, can simply refuse to sell
to anyone who will not maintain his prices; that a vendor, when dealing indirectly with such a person at the retail level, can act to protect his business
by refusing to sell to the offender's wholesale supplier.
The Colgate rule is subject to certain practical limitations. In the case of
a vendor dealing directly with a single retail price-cutter, the vendor's refusal
to continue doing business is economically feasible. On the other hand, the
vendor may be dealing with a single price-cutting retailer through a wholesaler
who also distributes the vendor's product to conforming retailers. Unless the
wholesaler initiates a preventive measure by way of an exercise of his own
right of refusal to deal, the vendor, in order to prevent the one instance of
price-cutting, must not only cut off the price-cutter but also the non-offending
wholesaler and retailers. In most cases, a vendor will not want to take such
drastic and unprofitable action. It is probably because of this situation that
19.
20.
21.
Parke
Id. at

362 U.s. at 37-38.
Id. at 43.
The dissent argued that Parke Davis acted unilaterally. 362 U.S. at 54. But the
Davis plan necessarily involved and in fact received cooperation of the wholesalers.
32-34.
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the dissent could not bring itself to accept the fact that the Colgate right could
exist and yet be ineffective.
The principal case makes it clear that the Court will not tolerate a vendor
in a non fair trade jurisdiction' using his right of refusal to deal as a threat
to gain compliance with his price policy in order to achieve indirectly what he
cannot achieve directly through agreements and combinations. As the "Colgate
doctrine" now stands, a vendor's only course of action, if he wishes to eliminate
price-cutting, is to cut off the offenders or those selling to offenders. The Court
has served notice that conduct over and above this will be penalized.
Attorneys-Refusal To Answer Questions at a Judicial Inquiry Into Unethical Practices as Ground for Disbarment.At a judicial inquiry into

illegal and unethical practices in negligence cases, respondent refused to answer
pertinent questions and to produce relevant records, invoking his constitutional
privilege against self incrimination.' A petition was then filed to discipline
respondent for violation of his obligations as a member of the legal profession.
The appellate division, one justice dissenting, entered an order disbarring him,
with leave to vacate the order within thirty days thereafter if he answered the
questions propounded and produced his records in accordance with the subpoena 2 The court of appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. While an attorney
has an absolute right to invoke the privilege against self incrimination, he may
not use it to absolve himself of his duty, as an officer of the court, to answer
pertinent questions or produce relevant records at a judicial inquiry into unethical conduct. In tIe Matter of Colken, 7 N.Y.2d 4S3, 166 N.E.2d 672, 199
N.Y.S.2d 658, cert. granted, 363 U.S. 810 (1960).
The courts maintain full supervisory and regulatory power over the legal
profession in order to insure the fair administration of justice. 'More particularly, the courts have the power to inquire into unethical practices of members
of the Bar, and to compel attorneys to give evidence concerning such practices.
Whenever the character and fitness of an attorney have been called into question as a result of such an inquiry, the court has the duty of re-eamining
him to determine whether he still possesses the requisite qualities to continue
as a member of the Bar. If he lacks such qualities, the court must disbar him,
not as punishment, but as discipline in the public interest. 3
22. Contracts or agreements prescribing minimum resale prices in fair trade jurkdictions
are excepted from the general prohibition of the Sherman Act. Sce note S supra. It i
questionable, however, whether the fair trade exception is broad enough to encompass
the conduct of the manufacturer in the instant case. The Court did note, nevertheke:2, that
the case arose in a non-fair-trade jurisdiction. 362 U.S. at 31.
1. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6.
2. In the Matter of Cohen, 9 App. Div. 2d 436, 195 N.Y.S.2d 9m (2d Dcp't 1959).
3. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90(2). See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 243 INY. 465, 162
N.E. 4S7 (192S); In the Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 31, 116 N.E. 702 (1917); In the
Matter of Brooklyn Bar Ass'n, 223 App. Div. 149, 227 N.Y. Supp. 666 (2d Dap't 192,);
In the Matter of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, 222 App. Div. 5 , 227
N.Y. Supp. I (2d Dep't 192S).
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It was early established, in In the Matter of RoIss, 4 that self incriminating
evidence given by an attorney, under a grant of immunity, may be used against
him in subsequent disbarment proceedings, since disbarment is regarded as
neither punishment for a crime nor penalty or forfeiture within the meaning
of the law. Further, an attorney called before a judicial inquiry into unethical
practices may be disciplined for asserting his privilege in bad faith.5 However,
the refusal of an attorney to sign a waiver of immunity in a case where he
otherwise would have it automatically was held by the second department, in
In the Matter of Solovei,6 not to be a ground for disbarment since, by his
willingness to testify, he was acting in good faith and not obstructing justice.
In In the Matter of Ellis7 and In the Matter of Grae,8 however, the same de4. 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917). Rouss testified at a conspiracy trial as a witness
for the prosecution and, although granted automatic immunity under N.Y. Pen. Laws §
584, was subsequently disbarred because of admissions made during the trial. See In the
Matter of Kaffenburgh, 188 N.Y. 49, 80 N.E. 570 (1907), where an attorney refused to
answer on the ground of self incrimination and was subsequently disbarred, but on grounds
other than his refusal to answer.
5. See, e.g., In the Matter of Levy, 255 N.Y. 223, 174 N.E. 461 (1931). The court left
open the question of whether a good faith assertion of the privilege would be a ground for
discipline.
6. 250 App. Div. 117, 293 N.Y. Supp. 640 (2d Dep't 1937), aff'd mem., 276 N.Y. 647,
12 N.E.2d 802 (1938). Under N.Y. Pen. Laws § 584, the witness had automatic immunity,
i.e., merely by testifying, he obtained immunity, and therefore could be compelled to testify
whether or not he waived immunity. In dictum, the court interpreted the holdings in
Kaffenburgh, 188 N.Y. 49, 80 N.E. 570 (1907), Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782 (1917), and
Levy, supra note 5, as indicating that an attorney who in good faith refused to answer
questions because they would tend to incriminate him was not amenable to disciplinary
proceedings. 250 App. Div. at 121, 293 N.Y. Supp. at 645. No distinction was made between
criminal proceedings and inquiries into unethical practices. Cf. In the Matter of Schneldkraut, 231 App. Div. 109, 246 N.Y. Supp. 505 (2d Dep't 1930).
7. 258 App. Div. 558, 566, 17'N.Y.S.2d 800, 808 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 282 N.Y. 435, 26
N.E.2d 967 (1940), wherein respondent not only refused to waive immunity, but refused
to testify on the ground of self incrimination, which is the precise issue in the instant case.
Ellis subsequently recanted, however, and informed the court of his willingness to testify
and comply with the directions of the court, but that he would not sign a waiver of immunity. The effect of this was to reduce the issue to whether refusal to sign a waiver of
immunity constituted a ground for discipline. The issue of his refusal to testify was left
open.
8. 258 App. Div. 576, 17 N.Y.S.2d 822 (2d Dep't), rev'd, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963
(1940). Ellis, supra note 7, and Grae, supra, were argued and decided on facts similar
to those in In the Matter of Solovei, 250 App. Div. 117, 293 N.Y. Supp. 640 (2d Dep't
1937). The distinguishing factor, however, was that the hearing in Grac and Ellis was a
judicial inquiry into unethical practices and not a grand jury investigation of conspiracy,
under which testifying witnesses would have automatic immunity. At the judicial Inquiry,
the witnesses, whether they believed so or not, apparently would not have had automatic
immunity and therefore could not be compelled to testify if the inquiring court could not
grant them immunity. The waivers, if signed, would have relinquished their right to refuse
to answer on the ground of self incrimination. To some extent, this explains the apparently
contrary result reached by the second department in In the Matter of Solovei, supra, as
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partment held that the refusal of an attorney to sign a waiver of immunity
when subpoenaed before a judicial inquiry into unethical practices, was an
obstruction of justice and ground for disbarment. Both cases were reversed
by the court of appeals, which ruled that although the inquiry was not a
criminal proceeding, the witnesses' testimony might espose them to subsequent
criminal prosecution. Hence, they could insist upon their constitutional privilege by refusing to sign waivers of immunity which, in light of their willingness
to testify, was neither bad faith nor an obstruction of justice making them
amenable to discipline.
In deciding the instant case, the lower court distinguished Grae and Ellis.
It found that the question of an attorney's right not to testify in reliance on
his constitutional privilege against self incrimination had never been reached
by the court of appeals in those cases.' 0 The court also advanced a second
argument which had not been previously considered with regard to attorneys.
Where one holds a position of trust and responsibility affecting the public
interest and demanding a high degree of moral character and he then refuses
on the ground of self incrimination to answer questions which seek to determine
whether he still possesses such character and fitness, he may be removed from
this position." It is "not that he is being punished for invoking his constitutional privilege, but rather that he is being removed from his position because
the agency, by reason of his refusal to furnish the information sought. is
entitled to conclude that he no longer possesses the requisite character and
fitness to continue in the agency's employ." 12 This rule was approved by the
United States Supreme Court in Bcilan v. Board of Educ."3 and Lcncr v.
Casey,'4- and recently in Nelson v. Los Angeles Cozenty.15 In these cases, the
well as the reasons behind the policy statement in Ellis, supra note 7, at 55, 17 .Y.S2d
at SOS.
9. In neither opinion did the court of appeals decide what the result would b2 if the
respondents had refused to answer by invoking the privilege, but rather confined it,, attention to their refusal to sign waivers of immunity in advance of testifying. In In the Matter
of Grae, supra note 8,at 435, 26 N.E.2d at 967, the court, in reverjing the decion of the
appellate division, adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Ellis, 253 App. Div. S5S, 567,
17 N.Y.S.2d SOD, 809 (2d Dep't 1940). For an interesting discus ion of the Ellis case, rz
Note, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 703 (1940); Note, 25 Cornell L.Q. 420 (1940); Note, 9 Fordbam
L. Rev. 2S4 (1940); Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. S71 (1940).
10. In the Matter of Cohen, 9 App. Div. 2d 436, 442, 195 N.Y.S2d 990, 997 (2d Dzp't
1959).
11. Id. at 444, 195 N.Y..2d at 999.
12. Ibid.
13. 357 U.S. 399 (1953).
14. 357 U.S. 468 (1953), affirming 2 N.Y.2d 355, 141 N.E.2d 533, 161 N.Y.S2d 7
(1957), affirming 2 App. Div. 2d 1, 154 N.Y.S.2d 461 (2d Dep't 1956). Cf. In the M"Aatter
of Delehanty, 2S0 App. Div. 542, 115 N.YS.2d 614 (1st Dep't), afi'd, 304 N.Y. 725, 103
N.E.2d 46 (1952). But see Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), which was
distinguished in Beilan, supra note 13, and Lerner, supra, on the ground that in Sloch.ower
the employee had been dismissed for refusing to answer queztions before a congresional
committee. The dismissal in Slochower was overturned because the employee was afforded
no hearing by his superiors.
15. 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
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Court upheld the dismissal of employees, disciplined as a result of their refusal
on the ground of self incrimination to answer questions posed by their superiors
relating to their alleged subversive political affiliations and their fitness and
character.
In advancing this second argument, the lower court recognized that in
cases where it had been applied previously, there had been specific statutes '
defining the individual's duty and the consequences of his refusal to answer.
However, it also emphasized that an attorney's duty and responsibility, though
not prescribed by statute, are of a higher nature. The principle of trust applicable in those cases applied here with even greater force. Affirming its
former policy in Grae and Ellis, the second department stated:
[E]very attorney has an absolute right to assert his constitutional privilege against
self incrimination as the basis for his refusal to give any explanation of his conduct
or his activities, and when he does so he cannot be compelled to testify. Thereupon, after opportunity for reflection (which was here given to the respondent), it
is for the attorney to choose whether he will rest upon his constitutional privilege
or whether he will discharge his duty to co-operate with the court in its judicial
inquiry into unethical practices. If, as here, he deliberately elects not to co-operate
with the court, then the court has no alternative but to revoke his privilege to continue as a member of the Bar. For his duty to the court is inviolable. He cannot
remain mute, thereby sterilizing the power of the court and frustrating its inquiry
into unethical practices, and yet be permitted to retain his privilege of membership
in an honorable profession. 16
In the instant decision, the court of appeals has affirmed both the reasoning
employed and the result reached by the second department. In doing so, however, it has departed from the logic of its own reasoning enunciated in the Grae
and Ellis cases, where it reiterated that "the constitutional privilege is a fundamental right and a measure of duty; its exercise cannot be a breach of duty
to the court."' 7 The present decision, sound as it may be, has placed a limit on
*Graeand Ellis. The latter cases are now confined to their particular facts and
issues, namely, refusal to waive immunity in advance of testifying, i.e., refusal
to forego the right to invoke the privilege, is not a ground for discipline. But
refusal to answer by invoking the privilege will be a sufficient basis for disclplinary action.
In his dissent,' 8 Judge Fuld adhered to the force of the reasoning of Grae
.and Ellis and, upon a review of all the prior decisions, concluded that an act
sanctioned by the fundamental law of the land cannot be considered a defiance
-of the court. The dissent, however, did not consider the "public trust"'19 im16. In the Matter of Cohen, 9 App. Div. 2d 436, 448, 195 N.Y.S.2d 990, 1003 (2d
iDep't 1959).
17. In the Matter of Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 435, 26 N.E.2d 963, 967 (1940), quoting In
the Matter of Ellis, 258 App. Div. 558, 572, 17 N.Y.S.2d 800, 813 (2d Dep't 1940) (dissenting opinion). See note 7 supra.
18. In the Matter of Cohen, 7 N.Y.2d 488, 498, 166 N.E,2d 672, 677, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658,
664 (1960).
19. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
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posed upon and voluntarily assumed by a lawyer, whereby his constitutional
rights are subordinated to the public interest. It did not deal with the argument that an individual has a constitutional privilege not to testify against
himself, but does not have a constitutional right to be a teacher, -3 policeman, 2
public official,- or, as in the instant case, a member of the legal profession.
The reasonableness of the majority's position is strengthened by the fact that
under the present immunity statute 3 the inquiring court apparently was not
a "competent authority" to grant the witness immunity from prosecution for
any crime revealed by self incriminating evidence. If the investigating tribunal
had authority to grant immunity, a different case would be presented. -1 Then,
it might be incumbent upon the tribunal to grant immunity from criminal
prosecution before it could discipline for failure to speak. But when, as here,
the court lacked authority to grant such immunity, the attorney's e.xercise of
the privilege was tantamount to complete frustration of the investigation.
Judge Fuld took issue with this argument, stating that "it is hardly necessary to say that a scrupulous regard for the constitutional limitation will not
20. See note 13 supra.
21. See note 14 supra.
22. See note 15 supra.
23. N.Y. Pen. Laws § 2447, which specifically limits the instances under which a vitncsz
may be granted immunity. N.Y1. Pen. Laws § 2447(4) provides that "immunity shall not
be conferred upon any peron except in accordance with the pro%isions of this fcction."
It must be conferred by a "competent authority," which includes:
(a) a court or a magistrate in a criminal proceeding other than a proceding before
a grand jury on application by the prosecuting attorney; or
(b) a court in a cvil proceeding to which the state is a party on application by the
attorney general; or
(c) a grand jury on application by the prosecuting attorney; or
(d) a legislative or state investigative body on concurrence of a majority thercof, and
with twenty-four hours prior written notice to the attorney general and the appropriate
district attorney having an interest therein; or
(e) the head of a state department in any investigation on twenty-four hours notice to
the interested parties in (d). N.Y. Pen. Laws § 2447(3).
Subdivision 3 further provides: "[Nlo such authority shall be deemed a competent
authority within the meaning of this section unless expre.sly authorized by statute to confer immunity."
Since there is no statute expressly authorizing a judicial inquiry into unethical practices
of the legal profession to confer immunity, it appears that such body was not a "competcnt
authority" in the instant case.
24. In conjunction with the enactment of N.Y. Pen. Laws § 2447, several amendment
to the existing laws providing for automatic immunity were passed. Thcse law3 were
thereby made subject to the provisions of § 2447, in order to provide a uniform procedure
for conferring immunity. See, e.g., N.Y. Pen. Laws § 5Z4. In order to obtain immunity
under the present rule, the witness must first invoke the prilege in good faith and, then,
the competent authority must direct him to answer. If the witnezs fails to comply, he
obtains no immunity and is therefore subject to contempt. See People v. Da Feo, 303 N.Y.
595, 127 N.E2d 592 (1955). For legislative background, see N.Y. Crime Comm'n Rep.
14-16, 26-29 (1953); N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep. 33 (1943).
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leave the disciplinary authority powerless or a guilty attorney immune. 5 However true this may be in the present case, his argument does not contemplate
a situation where the attorney is the sole repository of the information sought
to be elicited from him. In that instance, the court is in fact powerless to go
further, and the attorney will be immune from discipline as well as prosecution.
The only other alternative would be to bring the attorney before a grand jury,
grant him immunity, order him to testify, and then hold him in criminal con26
tempt if he persisted in his refusal.
The court's decision does not deprive an attorney, as an individual, of his
protection against self incrimination. However, it does place the duty of disclosure, which the attorney assumes when admitted to practice, above the
privilege against self incrimination accorded to a private citizen by the state
and federal constitutions. It recognizes the duty of disclosure as a condition
of membership in the legal profession. While an attorney may invoke his constitutional privilege and may still immunize himself against self incrimination,
he will enjoy no protection against disciplinary proceedings. By refusing to
perform his duty, he violates a fundamental condition of membership in the
27
Bar and thereby renders himself properly amenable to discipline.
Bankruptcy-Right of Action for Injury to Property as Asset of Bankrupt's Estate.-Defendant, a sheriff, levied on the truck of a judgment debtor.
From the sale of the truck, allegedly valued at $1,100, the defendant returned
proceeds of $375. Allegedly he had "rigged" the sale by employing a third
person to bid at a very low price. Three months later, the debtor having been
adjudged a bankrupt, plaintiff was appointed trustee. He commenced this
action under a Michigan statute providing for quintuple damages to anyone
injured by an officer's fraud in conducting an execution sale,1 expressly ,ffirming what was a voidable sale. 2 Upon trial, defendant successfully moved for
25. 7 N.Y.2d at 501, 166 N.E.2d at 679, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 668.
26. See In the Matter of the Second Additional Grand Jury, 10 App. Div.
N.Y.S.2d 26 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 220, 168 N.E.2d 663, 203 N.Y.S.2d
where this procedure was approved.
27. In the Matter of Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 168 N.E.2d 660, 203 N.Y.S.2d
leaves open the question of whether an attorney may be disbarred for a refusal
the attorney-client privilege.

2d 425, 202
841 (1960),
836 (1960),
based upon

1. "[Alnd if he [the officer conducting the sale] shall be guilty of any fraud in the
sale, or in the return, or shall unreasonably neglect to pay any money collected by him
on such execution, when demanded by the creditor therein, he shall be liable to an action
on the case, at the suit of the party injured, for 5 times the amount of the actual
damages sustained by reason of such fraud or neglect." Mich. Comp. Laws § 623.148
(1948).
2. The general rule is that a sheriff has a fiduciary obligation to the judgment debtor.
A purchase by him at the execution sale which he conducts is a breach of such duty, and
the sale becomes void. See, e.g., Coleman v. Malcom, 101 Ga. 303, 28 S.E. 861 (1897);
Harrison v. McHenry, 9 Ga. 164 (1850); Wickliff v. Robinson, 18 Ill. 145 (1856). Some
jurisdictions, apparently including Michigan, say that the sale is voidable rather than
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a dismissal. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, holding that a cause
of action pursuant to the statute is one based on fraud, nonassignable under
Michigan law, and, therefore, does not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy.3 Jones
v. Hicks, 35S Mich. 474, 100 N.W.2d 243 (1960).
The right of a trustee to sue on a cause of action belonging to the bankrupt
is governed by section 70a, subdivisions (5) and (6) of the Bankruptcy Act0
This section vests in the trustee title to all "property, including rights of action," belonging to the bankrupt which, on the petition date, might have been
either assigned voluntarily, or taken by judicial process pursuant to applicable
state law.5 It also vests "rights of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or
the unlawful taking or detention of or injury to his property."'3
There has long been a conflict in the cases as to the cumulative effect of
these two subdivisions, occasioned by the fact that subdivision (5) is expressly
dependent on state law, while no such limitation is annexed to the provisions
of subdivision (6). The confusion was more apparent in the period prior to
1938, when subdivision (5) did not expressly include rights of action.- The
cases in this period fell into three general categories. Some cases held that the
word "property" in subdivision (5) included rights of action and that before
any right of action could pass to the trustee, it must be deemed assignable
under applicable state law. s Other cases ignored the question of assignability
and looked to whether the right of action passed under subdivision (6).9 Still
void. See, e.g., Laac v. Clarke, 2 Gill 1 (Md. Ct. App. 144). See also People v. Twn=hip
Bd. of Overyssel, 11 Mlich. 222 (1S63).

3. The second point of this decision was a holding that, under Michigan law, it is
proper for a trial judge to grant a dismissal if the plaintiff's opening statement fails to
state a cause of action.
4. 30 Stat. 565 (193), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § li0a(S), (6) (1953).
(5) (1953). See MacLachlan, Bankruptcy § 169 (1956).

which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have tranferrei or wlhich
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial procecs against him, or otherx,,e

seized, impounded, or sequestered: Provided, that rights of actions ex delicto for libel,
slander, injuries to the person of the bankrupt or of a relative, whether or not reulting
in death, seduction, and criminal conversation shall not vest in the trustee unle:3 by the law
of the State such rights of action are subject to attachment, esecution, garnUhment, reque3tration, or other judicial process. . . ." 30 Stat. 565 (1S93), as amended, 11 U.SoC. § lea
(5) (1953). See MacLachlan, Bankruptcy § 169 (1956).
At least in considering rights of action, assignability under Michigan law appmrs to be

equated with amenability to judicial process. The approach may vary in other states.
See 4 Collier, Bankruptcy ff 70.15 (14th ed. 1942).
6. 30 Stat. 565 (1398), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § l10a(6).

7. See note 21 infra.
S. See, e.g., Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1933) (right of action arizing
upon contract for personal services) ; Bonillain v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 250 Fed. 641
(ElD. La. 1913) (right of action for violation of antitrust statute). See also Cleland v.
Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.N. 306 (1902), petition for rehearing denied, 66 Neb. 273,
96 N.W. 212 (1903), aff'd on rehearing, 66 Neb. 276, 93 N.W. 1075 (Os4), rev'd on
rehearing, 75 Neb. 273, 105 N.W. 1092 (1905); Kirby v. Fitzgerald, 57 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.
Cih. App. 1933).
9. E.g., Henderson v. Binkley Coal Co., 74 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1935) ; Hansen Mercantile
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other cases utilized subdivision (6), expressly denying the application of subdivision (5) to rights of action. 10
The weight of authority in this period supported the view that rights of action
falling within subdivision (6) need not be assignable. The trend of the cases
was toward a steady expansion of the scope of that subdivision. In re Harper"
held that a right of action for fraud, although nonassignable under state law,
passed to the trustee under subdivision (6) as an "injury to property." An
injury to property, the court stated, was "an actionable act whereby the estate
of another is lessened, other than a personal injury, or the breach of a contract."' 2 "Estate" in this context referred to "existing acquisitions, property
which otherwise, but for the tort, would have been available to his [the bankrupt's] creditors."'' 3 By using this broad definition, trustees have been able
to bring such tort actions as those for libel of a corporation,' 4 malicious attachment,' 5 violation of antitrust laws, 16 obtaining money or property by false
pretenses, 17 inducing the expenditure of money by fraudulent misrepresentations,' 8 and actions to recover excess tax payments.' 9 The In re Harper decision
Co. v. Wyman, Partridge & Co., 105 Minn. 491, 117 N.W. 926 (1908); Gurfein v. Howell,
142 Va. 197, 128 S.E. 644 (1925); C.I.T. Corp. v. Smith, 161 S.C. 1, 159 S.E. 453 (1931).
10. E.g., Tamm v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1935); Ruebush v. Funk, 63
F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1933); Young v. Roodner, 123 Conn. 68, 192 At. 710 (1937); Cleland v.
Anderson, 66 Neb. 276, 98 N.W. 1075 (1904). See Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725 (3d
Cir. 1925). Cf. In re Gay, 182 Fed. 260 (D. Mass. 1910); In re Harper, 175 Fed. 412
(N.D.N.Y. 1910).
11. 175 Fed. 412 (N.D.N.Y. 1910). This was one of the first cases to pass on the point.
12. Id. at 418, quoting N.Y. Sess. Laws 1880, ch. 22, § 3343(10). The use of the
term "actionable act" is in contradistinction to a physical act resulting In damage to
tangible property. The former includes the latter as well as verbal acts.
13. Boudreau v. Chesley, 135 F.2d 623, 624 (1st Cir. 1943), which held that a fraudulent
scheme causing the bankrupt to lose his job was not an "injury to property" because the
loss sustained was future wages and not property in existence at the time of the fraud.
14. Empire Tractor Corp. v. Time, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1950); In re
New York Woman, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Contra, Milwaukee Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Sentinel Co., 81 Wis. 207, 51 N.W. 440 (1892).
15. Hansen Mercantile Co. v. Wyman, Partridge & Co., 105 Minn. 491, 117 N.W. 926
(1908). Cf. Gurfein v. Howell, 142 Va. 197, 128 S.E. 644 (1925). Contra, Noonan v.
Orton, 34 Wis. 259 (1874).
16. Fazakerly v. E. Kahn's Sons Co., 75 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1935). Contra, Bonvillain
v. American Sugar Ref. Co, 250 Fed. 641 (E.D. La. 1918).
17. Constant v. Kulukundis, 125 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (bonds); In re Swofford
Bros. Dry Goods Co., 180 Fed. 549 (W.D. Mo. 1910) (assets of a corporation) ; In re Gay,
182 Fed. 260 (D. Mass. 1910); McGovern v. Kraus, 200 Wis. 64, 227 N.W. 300 (1929)
(promissory note and mortgage). The case of In re Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., supra,
presents the interesting situation of a wrongdoing corporate officer escaping liability by
purchasing all the corporate assets, including the right of action against himself, from the
trustee of the bankrupt corporation.
18. Herb Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1935); Tamm v. Ford
Motor Co., 80 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1935), 20 Minn. L. Rev. 814 (1936); In re Harper,
175 Fed. 412 (N.D.N.Y. 1910); Connolly v. National Sur. Co., 35 Ohio App. 76, 171 N.E.
870 (1929).
19. Charness v. Katz, 48 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Wis. 1943).
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established a definition of "injury to property" which encompassed practically
all but the most personal injuries.- 3
In 1938, Congress, in an attempt to eliminate the confusion surrounding
the trustee's title to rights of action, amended subdivision (5) so as to e.pressly
include "rights of action."2' 1 While this solved half the problem, it tended to
add some degree of credibility to the contention that all rights of action must
be assignable if they are to pass to the trustee. In this regard, cases may still
be found subsequent to the amendment interpreting subdivision (6) as though
it were a continuation of subdivision (5), i.e., they state - that before a right
23
of action passes to the trustee it must be assignable.
In the instant case, the bankrupt, on petition date, held title to two causes
of action: one sounding in replevin; the other based on fraud. The trustee
could have validly commenced an action to recover the truck under Michigan
law, but instead elected to pursue the statutory remedy.2-1 The majority and
dissent agreed at the outset that the trustee's title to the right of action
depended on its assignabilit, under state law, but parted company on the issue
of whether this was such a cause of action as could be assigned. The majority
held that a right of action in the form of one for damages resulting from a
fraud was "personal" and nonassignable. The dissent contended that the right
of action was akin to one for conversion and therefore should pass to
the trustee, since under Michigan law a right of action for conversion is
assignable.'
20. The court in In re Harper was one of several in the period before 1933 which
expressed the opinion that subdivision (5) did not cover rights of action. Injurie to
the person, feelings, or reputation of the bankrupt did not come within any of the dlases
of actions in subdivision (6). Therefore, it was established that they could not pass to
the trustee. The Chandler amendments in 193S clarified the situation by adding a provso
to subdivision (5) covering such personal actions. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 52 Stat. .79

(1938).
21. The purpose of the amendments was stated in this manner: "It is deemed adviable
to set forth comprehensibly, the property of a debtor which paszes, and which docs not
pass to the trustee. Although the additions, 'including rights of action' and the proviso
excepting purely personal actions which under applicable state law are not cubject to
judicial process, are merely declaratory of the existing law, they are clarifying and would
tend to avoid misunderstanding and misconstruction." 4 Collier, op. cit. supra note 5
I 70.03.
22. With the exception of the present case there have ben no actual holdings to this
effect since the 1938 amendments.
23. E.g., Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co, 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1957); Cobleigh v. State Land Office Bd., 305 Blich. 434, 9 N.W.2d 665, U6 (1943);
Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, 36 Wash. 2d 65, 220 P2d 695

(1950). Cf. Charness v. Katz, 4S F. Supp. 374 (E.D. Vis. 1943).
24. A recovery here would have netted the bankrupts estate q2,000, the trustee having
waived all damages above the amount of the sheriff's bond.
25. The dissent takes the better position in looking beyond the apparent form of the
action, for the majority approach is too rigid in the context of bankruptcy administration.
It is based on the common layw rule restricting assignability dezigned to combat the evils
of champerty and maintenance, i.e., a stranger to the occurrence or tranmction stirring
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Although the right of action asserted by the trustee in the instant case was
one arising upon an injury to property, 20 the decision was predicated solely
upon the theory that the right of action must be assignable. It is submitted
that the holding that state law governs the right of the trustee to sue ignores
the true meaning of subdivision (6) .27 The majority of cases consider this
subdivision as a separate and complete entity, either prescinding entirely from
the question of assignability, 28 or expressly denying that assignability is an
essential incident of rights of action which fall within the scope of subdivision (6).29 This appears to be the better position, for, as a matter of
statutory construction, if subdivision (5) is interpreted so as to cover all rights
of action, the inclusion of subdivision (6) in section 70a would be mere
redundancy. 30 Further, the cases deciding the issue solely under subdivision
(6) indicate a trend toward expanding the category of rights of action which
pass to the trustee. In making all rights of action subject to the laws of the
various states, the approach would be something less than progressive, since
the basic reason for restricting assignability of rights of action is based on a
up litigation which the injured party would never have brought. See, e.g., Grand Trunk
W. R. R. v. H. W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823, 336 (6th Cir. 1941). See also MacLachlan,
Bankruptcy § 170 (1956). A category of actions known as "personal" actions were made
nonassignable, and a cause of action for fraud was included within that group. But the
reason behind this rule is inapplicable to a trustee in bankruptcy, since the debtor, especially
in a voluntary petition, assumes an obligation to do whatever he can to preserve all his
assets for the benefit of his creditors. See generally Bankruptcy Form 1, 11 U.S.C. App.
(1958) (Debtor's Petition); Black, Bankruptcy § 99 (1924). See also Johnson v. Collier,
222 U.S. 538 (1912). The trustee, in bringing an action formerly belonging to the bankrupt,
is not a stranger forcing litigation for some personal benefit, but rather is in effect the
alter ego of the debtor assisting him to carry out his obligations in bankruptcy. See also
Remmers v. Remmers, 217 Mo. 541, 117 S.W. 1117 (1909); Hyde v. Tuffts, 45 N.Y.
Super. Ct. (13 Jones & S.) 56, 60 (1879).
26. It is clear that the right of action involved in the instant case does come within
the meaning of subdivision (6). For when an officer, in conducting an execution sale,
through fraudulent manipulation causes the property sold to be converted into a sum
much less than should reasonably be expected, he has hurt the judgment debtor in one
of two ways: if the proceeds which could have been reasonably expected would have been
equal to or less than the debt, the debtor is now subjected to a liability which he otherwise would not have had; or, if a surplus should have resulted, the debtor has lost money
which was due him. In the present case, it is not indicated which type of damage was
sustained. If it were of the second type, the right of action would clearly come within
the category of "injury to property" as so broadly defined by the In re Harper decision.
If the injury fell within the first category, then the fraud has in effect lessened the estate
of the bankrupt by increasing the amount of claims to his remaining assets.
27. Subdivision (6) is specific and subdivision (5) is a residuary clause.
28. See, e.g., Graybar Elec. Co. v. Doley, 273 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1959); Gochenour v.
George & Francis Ball Foundation, 35 F. Supp. 508 (S.D. Ind. 1940), aff'd, 117 F.2d 259
(7th Cir. 1941). Cf. Boudreau v. Chesley, 135 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1943); Constant v.
Kulukundis, 125 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

29. E.g., Empire Tractor Corp. v. Time, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Pa. 1950); In
re New York Woman, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 831 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
30. See 3 Remington, Bankruptcy § 1211.04 (1957), where such a conclusion Is implied.
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technical rule of common law which was not designed to cover the type of
situations arising in bankruptcy administration.3 1 The progressive approach
is more in line with the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, which is to marshall
and distribute all nonexempt objects and things of pecuniary value belonging
32
to the debtor, for the benefit of the creditors.
The route by which the Michigan court reached its conclusion in the instant
case is not uncommon, but is, nonetheless, questionable. The case relied upon
by the court, though somewhat analogous, is not really in point. That case,
Cobleigh v. State Lanrd Office Bd.,33 decided that a statutory right to reclaim
property placed in auction at a tax sale by matching the highest bid did not
pass to the trustee because Michigan had made such a right nonassignable.
Clearly, no right of action coming under subdivision (6) was involved.-"
Further, the authorities cited in Cobleigh for the proposition that the law of
31. See note 25 supra.
32. See, e.g., Gochenour v. George & Francis Ball Foundation, 35 F. Supp. S03, 513
(S.D. Ind. 1940); In re Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., IN0 Fed. 549, 556 (W.D. Mo.
1910). The fact that the Michigan statute provided for quintuple damagc5 raiL=a an
interesting complication to an already clouded picture, for although the basic jury verdict
for damages would be compensation for an "injury to propcrty," the remainder of the
award would be a penalt,, [see Jones v. Hicks, 35S Mich. 474, 100 N.W.2d 243 (190);
Nordling v. Johnston, 205 Ore. 315, 2S3 P.2d 994 (1955)] which under common law can be
recovered only by the party injured. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper
Co., 232 Fed. 574, 577 (2d Cir. 1916); Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protcctive Order of
Keglers, 36 Wash. 2d 6S5, 220 P.2d 655 (1950). The reason for this rule is identical to that
supporting the prohibition of assignments of "personal actions." See WVilson v. Shrader,
13 N. Va. 105, 79 S.E. 1033 (1913). The reasoning is, however, inapplicable to a truztee.
See note 25 supra. Nevertheless, some courts have found that the trustee could not rccovcr
because the right of action was not assignable. See, e.g., Bonvillai! v. American Sugar Ref.
Co., 250 Fed. 641 (EfD. La. 1913). The majority of cases considering the question, however, have been decided in favor of the trustee, the courts finding either: (1) The underlying cause of action is assignable. See, e.g., McCollum v. Hamilton Nat'l Ban:, 303 U.S.
245 (1933); First Natl Bank v. Lasater, 196 U.S. 115 (105), revering 95 Te, 345, 72
SMW. 1057 (1903) (usury statutes); Fazakerly v. E. Kahn's Sons Co., 75 F.2d 110 (5th
Cir. 1935 (antitrust statute); Ripple v. Mortgage & Acceptance Corp., 193 N C. 422, 137
SE. 156 (1927); Nordling v. Johnston, supra. (2) The basic cause of action pas.rf
automatically by virtue of subdivision (6). See, e.g., Fazaherly v. E. Kahn's Sons Co.,
supra at 114. (3) The trustee is the alter ego of the bankrupt, acceding to each and every
one of his rights. See, e.g., Reed v. American-German Nat'l Bank, 155 Fed. 233 (C.C W.D.
Ky. 1907) (usury statute); Kelter v. American Bankers' Fin. Co., 305 Pa. 433, 1co Atl.
127 (1932). The underlying premise in each of these cases was that the right to the
penalty follows incidentally with the right of action. The courts as yet have not been
called upon to consider a statute such as is found in the prezent case. However, it ib
noteworthy that they have allowed the trustee recovery of a penalty under usury ctatutea,
since rights of action for "injury to property" and those for usury are part of the came
subdivision of section 70a. See generally 4 Collier, op. cit. supra note 5, 70.23; 3 Remington, op. ciL supra note 30, §§ 1211.03, .12, .13. The fact that the latter type of action
carries with it penalty rights is a strong indication that the former does also.
33. 305 Mich. 434, 9 N.W.2d 665 (1943).
34. See text accompanying notes 6 and 12 supra.
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the state concerning assignability determines whether a right of action passes
to the trustee were far removed from the question here involved. 85
The decision in the principal case illustrates how general statements contained in a few cases have been perpetuated and eventually converted into
holdings. Although one decision in a state court may not indicate an urgent
need for amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, it would indicate the need for
vigilance to insure that the error spreads no further.

Conflict of Laws-Effect of Subsequent Marriage of Litigants on Premarital Tort.-Plaintiff brought suit to recover for injuries suffered while
riding in defendant's automobile in Massachusetts. Subsequent to the commencement of the action, the parties were married in Arkansas, and have since
resided as husband and wife in New Hampshire. Defendant moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that suit could not be prosecuted in New Hampshire because it could not be maintained in Massachusetts where the accident
occurred. Decision was reserved by the superior court and the issue transferred,
without a ruling, to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. The court
unanimously denied defendant's motion, finding no plain indication in the
Massachusetts decisions that the marriage of the parties in any way extinguished a pre-existing cause of action between them. Absent such a determination by the Massachusetts judiciary, there was no basis for holding that
plaintiff's cause of action was extinguished under New Hampshire law. Morin
v. Letourneau, 102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d 131 (1959).
At common law, neither spouse could sue the other for torts committed
before' or during2 coverture. The majority of American jurisdictions has
adhered to the rule precluding interspousal suits for personal injuries,8 and, in
these same jurisdictions, it has generally been held that the disability obtains
even if the tort occurred prior to marriage. 4 A minority, however, has permitted
spouses to sue in exactly the same capacity as if they were single.5 This
confusion, occasioned by the dissimilar married women's acts, has been compounded by the application of traditional conflict of laws principles to the
area of foreign torts.
35. Horton v. Moore, 110 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1940) (contingent future interest In real
property); In re Seiffert, 18 F.2d 444 (D.C. Mont. 1926) (growing crops and wages).
Neither of these cases were concerned with rights of action.
1. Spector v. Weisman, 40 F.2d 792 (D.C. Cir. 1930).
2. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). See Prosser, Torts § 101 (2d cd. 1955).
3. E.g., Cubbison v. Cubbison, 73 Cal. App. 2d 437, 166 P.2d 387 (1946). See Annot.,
43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955) (comprehensive collection of cases).
4. See, e.g., Hunter v. Livingston, 125 Ind. App. 422, 123 N.E.2d 912 (1955). But see
Foote v. Foote, 170 Cal. App. 2d 435, 339 P.2d 188 (1959), where a cause of action for a
premarital tort was treated as a separate property right of the wife not affected by her
subsequent marriage.
5. See, e.g., Leach v. Leach, 227 Ark. 599, 300 S.W.2d 15 (1957).
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The general rule in conflict of laws situations is that the existence and
extent of a cause of action are governed by the law of the place where the
wrong occurred.3 However, recent developments support a view that, in
family suits arising out of wrongs committed in foreign jurisdictions, the rights
of the parties should be determined in accordance with the law of their
domicile.7 No practical problem is presented where the domicile and the state
of the wrong have the same public policy regarding the right of spouses to sue.
But where public policies conflict, it becomes essential to determine whether
the capacity to sue is an element of the cause of action and part of the substantive rights of the parties, or merely an element of remedial procedure.
It is clear that the public policy of Massachusetts prohibits spouses from
suing one another for negligent torts.8 Massachusetts has also determined that
a subsequent marriage of the parties will bar, during the tenure of the marriage, any suit based upon a pre-existing cause of action.0 The public policy
of New Hampshire, however, is not opposed to interspousal suits, arising either
prior to or during marriage.' Consequently, which law should be applied in
determining whether a subsequent marriage extinguishes a pre-existing cause of
action? The instant court, while cognizant of the recent trend in this area,"
applied the traditional rule and approached the substantive rights of the
parties via the lex loci delicti. In so doing, however, it reached a conclusion
directly contrary to the result reached by the New York Court of Appeals in
an identical case. The divergent analyses point up the inconsistency plaguing
2
this area of the law. In Coster v. Costcry,
the court of appeals analyzed the
applicable Massachusetts law and found that the wife's "right to bring and to
maintain the suit and to recover damages against her spouse is a substantive
right, a part of her cause of action and not a mere matter of remedy ....
As to substantive rights, the lex loci, not the law of the forum, controls and
6. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 373 (1934); 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 37,1,2 (1935).
7. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 420, 289 P.2d 210, 223 (1955); Koplik v. C. P.
Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 11-12, 141 A.2d 34, 40 (1958); Ford, InteUrpousal Liability for
Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Rcztatemcnt,
15 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 397 (1954); Kelso, Automobile Accidents and Indiana Conflict of Laws:
Current Dilemmas, 33 Ind. L.J. 297 (1957); Seavey, Torts, 1953 Ann. Survey Am. L-, 34

N.YX.L. Rev. 517, 527 (1959); Comment, 15 Wash. &Lee L. Rev. 266, 275-76.
3. "A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if che were cle;
but this section shall not authorize suits between husband and v.ife." Dla. Gcn. Lar;s
Ann. ch. 209, § 6 (1955). See Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mlass. 550, 552, 73 N.E2d 637, 633
(1948), where a wife was forbidden to sue her former spouse for his tortious conduct during
their marriage, "for the more fundamental reason that because of the marital rclationhip

no cause of action ever came into existence.'
9. Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mlass. 39, 193 N.E. 320 (1936).

10. "Every married woman . ..may ...sue and be sucd, in all matters in law
and equity . . . as if she were unmarried." N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 460:2 (1955). See
Miltimore v. Milford Mlotor Co., 89 N.H. 272, 197 AUt. 330 (193S).
11. 102 N.H. at -, 156 A.2d at 132. The court cited, among others, the authorities
referred to in note 7 supra.
12. 289 N.Y. 433, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943), 12 Fordham L. Rev. 132.
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will be enforced in the courts of the forum . ... ",13 The court correctly stated
the traditional rule respecting substantive rights. However, its interpretation
that the wife's right to sue was extinguished, rather than merely prohibited,
clashes with the analysis of the instant case and, it would appear, with
Massachusetts' formulation of its own law. Where a cause of action existed
prior to the marriage of the parties, Massachusetts has deemed the incapacity
to sue to be a disability removed by 14the termination of the marriage rather
than an element of the cause of action.
The variance between Coster and the present case is traceable directly to
their interpretations of Lubowitz v. Taines.'5 The New York court construed
that decision as substantively depriving a spouse of her right of action. The
New Hampshire court found that Lubowitz merely prohibited a wife from
enforcing her claim against her husband in Massachusetts. The latter court's
reasoning was based primarily upon two Massachusetts decisions. It distinguished the situation in Callow v. Thomas,' where it was held that no cause
of action ever arose between the spouses because they were already married,
from the situation in Lubowitz, where it was never questioned that a right of
action arose because the parties were unmarried when the accident occurred.
Nowhere did the court find that Lubowitz stood for the proposition that a subsequent marriage extinguished the pre-existing cause of action or that its
continued existence was conditioned upon remaining unmarried to the defendant.'7 The court also relied upon the discussion of Lubowitz in Pittsley v.
David.'8 There the discussion indicated "that the wife's disability to maintain
her action in that case rested upon the husband's 'immunity from actions at law
by the wife,' rather than upon any extinguishment of the cause because of
marriage or any 'universal legal identity' resulting therefrom."' 9 It is submitted that the New Hampshire analysis is a more realistic appraisal of the
Massachusetts law than Coster, and more in conformity with the public policy
that the domicile should determine the right of spouses to sue.20
13. 289 N.Y. at 442, 46 N.E.2d at 511-12.
14. In Giles v. Giles, 279 Mass. 284, 181 N.E. 176 (1932), it was held that a wife could
not maintain a suit in equity against her husband to recover money lent to him before
their marriage. But after the parties were divorced, it was held that suit could be
prosecuted. Giles v. Giles, 293 Mass. 495, 200 N.E. 378 (1936). See also Adams v. Adams,
- Mass. -, 157 N.E.2d 405 (1959) ; Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. 552, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937).
15. 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935).
16. 322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948).
17. Morin v. Letourneau, 102 N.H. at -, 156 A.2d at 133 (1959).
18. 298 Mass. 552, 11 N.E.2d 461 (1937).
19. 102 N.H. at -, 156 A.2d at 133-34, citing Pittsley v. David, 298 Mass. at 553, 11
N.E.2d at 463.
20. A recent New York case, Pryor v. Merchants Mut. Cas. Co., 12 Misc. 2d 801, 174
N.Y.S.2d 24 (Sup. Ct. 1958), has expressed dissatisfaction with the Coster ruling. "[Slince
New York has no law or policy against entertaining this cause of action which had accrued
to plaintiff under Pennsylvania law, it should not set up an artificial barrier to defeat
plaintiff's right. That is what is done when we label the limiting provision of the Massachusetts statute 'substantive.' The limitation in fact goes only to the remedy because of
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In permitting the plaintiff to prosecute her suit in New Hampshire, however,
the instant case conflicted with still another parallel situation, resolved in
Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki.2 There the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut,
weighing the substantive rights of the parties under Pennsylvania law, also concluded that a prenuptial right to sue one's spouse was merely suspended during
the period of marriage.22 Nevertheless, the wife's right to recover in Connecticut was rejected. The court held that "the law of

. .

. [Pennsylvania] creates,

defines and limits her right of action. As she could not maintain this cause of
action in that state, she cannot maintain it here." - 3 In failing to limit plaintiff's
right of action in accordance with the Massachusetts prohibition, the principal
case has, in effect, reduced the question of substantive rights to one of remedy,
and again has adopted a more realistic view of the conflicts problem.
The frustration attendant upon applying the lcx loci dclkcti to interspousal
suits is obvious. That marital accord should be fostered is objected to by no
one, and it is a proper state function to safeguard marital harmony. However,
it should be exercised over its own domiciliaries, and should not be given extraterritorial effect. This approach has been espoused in recent decisions as the
more reasonable view. 4 In Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp.,2 3 the court
rejected the application of New York law which permitted suit, stating:
[1]e hold the view that even where an actual conflict of laws problem is directly
presented, it is sensible and logical to have disabilities to sue and immunities from
suit arising from the family relationship determined by reference to the law of the
state of the family domicile when the suit is brought in that state. Otherw:ise, the
lex loci will be permitted to interfere seriously with a status and a policy which the
state of residence is primarily interested in maintaining. 0
The problem of selecting a forum is also presented. Domiciliaries of a state
prohibiting interspousal suits, if injured in a state allowing such actions, could
the public policy of Massachusetts. . . . Since the provision against a parzon suing his
spouse is not consonant with New York law or public policy, it should not be given
effect here. Else another State is legislating for us." Id. at '04, 174 N.Y3S2d at 27. The
court held, however, that in view of Coster the law could only be changed by the lc,-Elature
or the court of appeals and the complaint was dismissed.
21. 142 Conn. 27S, 113 A.2d 509 (1955).
22. The court cited Cardamone v. Cardamone, 9 Pa. D. & C. 723 (1924), as supporting
the proposition that even though plaintiff had a cause of action and had institutcd Euit
against her future husband, the subsequent marriage to him denied her that right as long
as the marriage status continued. Id. at 232, 113 A.2d at 511. See also Johnon v. Pcoplvs
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1953), indicating that a widow
could sue her husband's executor for the husband's negligent conduct during coverture.
Her right to sue was prescribed only during the term of their marriage.
23. 142 Conn. at 233, 113 A.2d at 511.
24. See note 7 supra.
25. 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (195S), 27 Fordham L. Rev. 422. The facts were cimilar
to the instant case, except that the lex loci allowed interspousal suits while the domicile.
New Jersey, prohibited such suits. The subsequent marriage was held to close the state's
tribunals to the wife's claim.
26. 27 N.J. at 11-12, 141 A.2d at 40 (dictum).
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sue therein, thereby contravening the public policy of their domicile. But if
domiciliaries of a state permitting interspousal suits are involved in an accident
in a jurisdiction not allowing such suits, they would have no remedy for their
wrong in either jurisdiction. In one instance, the public policy of the domicile
is flaunted because of the incidence of a state line; in the other, the parties
are deprived of the rights granted them by their domicile because of the extraterritorial influence of a sister state.
Regulation by the domicile state will also provide more adequate protection
against collusive interspousal suits and unjust corroding of the contract between
the insurer and the insured. In New York, although the legislature has permitted one spouse to sue the other, 27 policies of insurance issued to motor
vehicle owners need not insure against injuries to the spouse of the owner
unless specifically provided for in the policy.2 8 If the policy provides for such
increased coverage in the event of an accident involving the spouse of the
owner, and the accident occurs in a state prohibiting interspousal suits, the
insurance company is unjustly enriched to the extent of the premiums paid
for such coverage, and the insured is deprived of protection which he would
otherwise have had except for the incidence of state boundaries. In the same
manner, an insurance company in a state prohibiting interspousal suits may not
charge rates to cover this type of protection and yet may find itself liable to
occurs and an action is brought in a state authorizthe insured if the accident
20

ing interspousal suits.

By allowing the domicile of the parties to determine the capacity of spouses
to sue, a major conflict of law would be removed in both tort and contract
actions. The element of doubt as to what comprises the substantive rights of
the parties within the law of the place of the wrong would be removed and a
uniform public policy for all domiciliaries of a state would be assured. "Forum
shopping" for a favorable court within which to bring suit would be greatly
reduced and state boundary lines would no longer affect the rights and duties
for which the insured and the insurance company contracted. In deciding the
instant case, the New Hampshire court has taken an important step forward
in reducing the issue to one of prohibition of suit, a question of remedy. But
the court should have stated in clear and unmistakable language, rather than
merely inferred, the right of the domicile to govern the capacity of its spouses
to sue.

Real Property-Affirmative Covenant Running With the Land.-Defendant's predecessor in title contracted with plaintiff's predecessor to furnish heat
to a building on plaintiff's land and to maintain the necessary heating pipes for
that purpose. The agreement was to continue in effect as long as both buildings remained standing and in use, and it expressly bound the heirs, adminis27. N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 57.
28. N.Y. Ins. Law § 167(3).
29. See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blake, 94 N.H. 141, 47 A.2d 874 (1946), and
Bradford v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 179 Misc. 919,39 N.Y.S.2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
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trators, and assignees of the original parties. Defendant's deed did not specifically mention the covenant. Defendant was aware of the terms, however, since
the deed to its immediate predecessor, alleged to be its agent, was e-pressly
subject to the covenant. Defendant refused to comply with the agreement. In
an action for specific performance, the New York Supreme Court dismisssed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The appellate division affirmed,1
reasoning that a covenant to furnish heat is affirmative in nature and may not
run with the land. The New York Court of Appeals reversed 2 and held that
the covenant, although affirmative in nature, "touched or concerned" the land
to a substantial degree and therefore ran with the land. Nicholson v. 300
Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 164 N.E.2d 832, 196 N.Y.S.2d 945
(1959).
Prior to Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Ban., 3
the general attitude of the New York courts toward affirmative covenants running with the land was one of hostility. This view was crystallized in the
leading case of Miller v. Clary,4 wherein the court refused to enforce a covenant
to construct and maintain a shaft for water power, which had been made by
the predecessors of the parties in interest. The court held that subject to certain
traditional exceptions,5 affirmative covenants do not run with the land so as
to place the burden of performance on a subsequent grantee.0 The Miller
doctrine placed New York in direct opposition with the other states.Y In
1. 6 App. Div. 2d 627, 180 N.YS.2d 535 (3d Dep't 1953).
2. In conjunction with his action for specific performance, plaintiff sought to recover
damages occasioned by defendant's failure to perform the agrcemenL Suircqucnt to the
filing of the appeal, but prior to argument before the court of appcal, plaintiff sold his
building to defendant corporation. The court held that even though a decree for scific
performance had become impossible, the appeal could not be dismiszzd as academic since
there still existed the possibility of damages for breach of the agremenL Therefore, a cause
of action for damages had been sufficiently stated in the complaint on two se-parate theories:
for breach of a covenant running with the land or for breach of a creditor beneficiary agreement.
3. 278 N.Y. 243, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1933), wherein the court held that a covenant to pay
a cash assessment for the maintenance of community fadlitics ran with the land.
4. 210 N.Y. 127, 103 N.E. 1114 (1913).
5. E.g., Crawford v. Krollpfeiffer, 195 N.Y. ISS, 8 N.E. 29 (1909) (covenant relating
to party walls); Post v. West Shore R.R., 123 N.Y. 5M0, 26 N.E. 7 (1S90) (covenant to
provide railway crossings); Satterly v. Erie R.R., 113 App. Div. 462, 99 N.YS. 30 (2d
Dep't 1906) (covenant to build fences along boundary lines). The instant case rccognized
these and other exceptions. 7 N.Y.2d at 244, 164 N.E.2d at 134, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
6. Accord, Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York & Queens County Ry., 253 N.Y. 190, 170
N.E. S37 (1930). In that case, a mortgage, with an after-acquired property clauze, v.as
found not to bind the company merging with the mortgagor corporation so as to impoae
upon the company the burden of giving a mortgage upon after-acquired property. The
court reasoned that since Miller held that an affirmative covenant does not run with the
land, "a fortiori the same result must follow where there is an attempt to charge the
burden upon another and independent parcel." 253 N.Y. at 204, 170 N.E. at S92.
7. See generally Annot., 102 A.L.R. 731 (1936); Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1363 (1926) (exhaustive collection of cases); cf. Lloyd, Enforcement of Affirmative Agreements Re:pting
the Use of Land, 14 Va. L. Rev. 419 (192S).
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Neponsit, however, while explicitly acknowledging the broad Miller rule, the
court of appeals mitigated the force of its prior decision by enunciating new
criteria for the running of real property covenants. Adopting a practical approach to the problem, based on the effect of the covenant rather than on technical distinctions, the court said that a covenant will run if it touches or
concerns land to a substantial degree. 8 This test, in essence, was employed by
other states,9 and, in effect, disposed of the artificial distinction between affirmative and negative covenants. While the more liberal "touch or concern" test
advanced in Neponsit appeared to obliterate the distinction between affirmative and negative covenants since either type of obligation may equally alter an
owner's rights, the Neponsit court expressly endorsed the presumption created
by Miller against the enforceability of affirmative burdens. 10 An uncertainty
remained whether Neponsit merely added another exception to the Miller doctrine or whether it in fact abolished the rule." Unfortunately, this confusion
has not been dispelled with complete satisfaction by the instant decision. The
majority based its holding upon Neponsit, but cited Miller without in so many
words overruling it, 12 thus leaving the same implication as Neponsit, that
Miller is still the law. This implication was specifically embraced in the concurring opinion, 13 thereby putting life back into a distinction all but formally
pronounced dead. Except for the fact that the present decision relied upon
Neponsit, however, which in turn expressly reaffirmed Miller, it would appear
from the court's synopsis that the latter case would unquestionably be overruled.
Neponsit and the present case are inconsistent with Miller, although distinguishable in the world of words as exceptions. The traditional judicial disdain for overruling decisions, often harmful, is especially evident here, since
Miller is based upon foundations of questionable strength. The Miller court
deemed its holding to be merely declarative of an established New York rule,
8. The court stated:
[A] covenant which runs with the land must affect the legal relations-the advantages and
the burdens-of the parties to the covenant, as owners of particular parcels of land...
The test is based on the effect of the covenant rather than on technical distinctions. Does
the covenant impose, on the one hand, a burden upon an interest in land, which on the
other hand increases the value of a different interest in the same or related land? . . .
rW]hether a particular covenant is sufficiently connected with the use of land to run with
Thus, unless we exhalt technical
the land, must be in many cases a question of degree ....
form over substance, the distinction between covenants which run with land and covenants
which are personal, must depend upon the effect of the covenant on the legal rights which
otherwise would flow from ownership of land and which are connected with the land.
The problem then is: Does the covenant in purpose and effect substantially alter these
rights? 278 N.Y. 248, 257-58, 15 N.E.2d 793, 796 (1938).
9. See, e.g., Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441 (1895). See
generally Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1363, 1365 (1926).
10. The court stated in specific language: "We have not abondoned the historic distinction drawn by the English courts." 278 N.Y. at 256, 15 N.E.2d at 796.
11. See Note, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1299 (1938); Note, 24 Cornell L.Q. 133 (1938).
12. 7 N.Y.2d 240, 244, 164 N.E.2d 832, 834, 196 N.Y.S.2d 945, 948 (1959).
13. Id. at 248, 164 N.E.2d at 837, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 952, in an opinion by Judge Van
Voorhis, in which Judge Dye concurred.
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which, in turn, was allied with the English view. 1 Millcr cited the English
cases of Azsterberry v. Corporation of Oldham,'" London & So. WV. Ry. v.
Gomm,lc and Harwood v. Bruns-wick Bldg. Soc'y.Yr in support of its position.

While the Haywood case stands for the proposition that affirmative covenants
cannot run with the land, Austerberry and Gomm are doubtful authority on

this point. s Nor do the New York precedents cited in Mil!cr warrant formulation of the Miller doctrine. In Kidder v. Port Henry Iron Ore Co.,10 the complaint was dismissed for technical insufficiency, and the merits of the case were
not passed upon. Reid v. McCrum2 held that a covenant to procure insurance

in a mortgage was merely personal and did not run with the land. No mention
was made of its affirmative nature. The confusion in the cases was recognized

by Miller, and for a solution the court was quick to point out exceptions to its
doctrine.21 The instant decision acquiesced in the validity of these exceptions

and introduced others. 2 The cases from which these exceptions stem, however,
fail to present any rationale explaining why the particular affirmative covenant

in issue should be enforced as an exception to the general rule.P It appears
14. 210 N.Y. at 132-36, 103 N.E. at 1116-17.
15. [185] 29 Ch. D. 750 (alternative holding, semble) (covenant to repair a toll road;
no time limit).
16. [1SS2] 20 Ch. D. 562 (alternative holding) (covenant by grantee to reconvey at
request of grantor; no time limit).
17. [18S1] S Q.B.D. 403 (covenant to repair buildings; no time limit).
1S. The ratio decidendi of the Austerberry case is not clear. The court made the
following statements, but did not indicate which was the basis of its holding: (1) affirmafive covenants do not run with the land; (2) covenants requiring the expenditure of money
do not run with the land; (3) the covenant in question v.as merely personal; (4) the
parties did not intend the covenant to run with the land; and (5) the benefit of the
covenant probably did run with the land. 29 Ch. D. at 773, 7M3-$4,
The Gomm decision was based upon a violation of the rule against remotene: and a
violation of a statute rendering the act ultra vires, as well as upon the reason that affirmative covenants do not run with the land.
Consideration must also be given to the facts that these cases were decided in the
nineteenth century and that they do not have the force of binding authority in America.
Furthermore, Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 16a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 15S3) (covenant to construct a brick wall), seems to have been the authority on this subject at the time the
United States became a sovereign. This case approved affirmative covenants running with
the land.
19. 153 App. Div. 931, 133 N.Y. Supp. 1124 (3d Dep't 1912), aff'd mem., 207 N.Y.
763, 101 N.E. 1107 (1913).
20. 91 N.Y. 412 (1SS3).
21. See note 5 supra. The court recognized that further limitations of the rule might be
required. 210 N.Y. at 136, 103 N.E. at 1117.
22. See 7 N.Y.2d at 244 n.2, 164 N.E.2d at S34-35 n.2, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 949 n2.
23. It would appear that the New York courts enforced thece covenants becauce they
were of reasonable duration and in accepted general usage. The benefit conferred apparently outweighed the burden upon the free alienability of land. Cf. Atlas Land Corp. v.
Ettinger, 233 App. Div. 379, 123 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1st Dep't 1954). In its treatment of affirmative obligations against subsequent holders of burdened land, the instant court drew no
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that the court in Miller unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile a confused area
of law with the panacea of an arbitrary rule and exception.
Despite the latent implication of Neponsit and the assumption of Judges Van
Voorhis and Dye in the instant case that the Miller rule has remained intact, it
is submitted that the court has sub silentio overruled Miller. Approaching this
issue from the context of the appellate division's determination that an affirmative covenant to provide heat cannot run with the land, the court of appeals
framed the precise question for decision: "[D]oes the affirmative character of
the covenant exclude24it from the classification of covenants which 'touch' or
'concern' the land?"
The court answered negatively. Again it affirmed its
disposition, manifested in Neponsit, to look to substance rather than technical
form.2 5 It again recognized the "touch or concern" test, basing its analysis not

on technical distinctions but rather on the purpose and effect of the covenant,
i.e., did it effect a substantial alteration of the rights in the land? 26 Although
Miller was mentioned, the court did not express approval of the rule as it had
done in Neponsit. Rather, its emphasis was plainly focused upon the broad
language and liberal criteria advanced by Neponsit. The crux of the opinion
was the court's formulation of the present status of the law:
Having in mind the question now presented for decision, the law may be briefly
summarized. The burden of affirmative covenants may be enforced against subsequent holders of the originally burdened land whenever it appears that (1) the
original covenantor and covenantee intended such a result; (2) there has been a
continuous succession of conveyances between the original covenantor and the party
now sought to be 27
burdened; and (3) the covenant touches or concerns the land to a
substantial degree.
Nowhere did the court contrast affirmative and negative covenants. Rather,
its language plainly indicated that such a distinction is no longer valid. Affirmative covenants will operate to bind subsequent grantees, provided there is a
substantial alteration of the legal relations of the parties as owners of the
parcels of land. In its objection, the concurring opinion failed to distinguish
between substance and form. Where is the distinction between a covenant to
furnish heat and maintain pipes and a covenant to construct and maintain a
shaft for water power? There is an understandable policy against unduly
encumbering land. A recognized onus of affirmative covenants has always been
the burden placed upon subsequent holders, compelling them to act in perpetuo
and possibly preventing the land from being put to other profitable use. Negative restrictions, however, are equally objectionable as a hinderance to marketability. It is submitted that limitations on the running of covenants should not
be imposed on a basis of mere form, negative as 28against affirmative, but rather
upon their power to encumber land indefinitely.
distinction between purely equitable servitudes and other covenants which run with the
land at law. See generally Clark, Real Covenants and Other Interests Which "Run With
Land" 72, 148 (1929).
24. 7 N.Y.2d at 244, 164 N.E.2d at 834, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 948.
25. Id. at 245, 164 N.E.2d at 835, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
26. Ibid.
27. 7 N.Y.2d at 245, 164 N.E.2d at 835, 196 N.Y.S.2d at 949-50.
28. The court of appeals specifically noted that the covenant at bar was to run only
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Sales-Absence of Privity in Breach of Warranty Action.-Plaintiff was
injured while driving an allegedly defective automobile shortly after it was
purchased by her husband from defendant dealer. Suit was instituted by plaintiff against both the dealer and the manufacturer. Her husband joined in the
action seeking compensation for his consequential losses. The suit was predicated on breach of express and implied warranties and upon negligence. The
trial court dismissed the negligence counts and submitted to the jury the issue
of implied warranty of merchantability. From a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs,' the defendants appealed. The case was certified by the Supreme Court
of New Jersey prior to consideration in the appellate division. The supreme
court affirmed, holding that there was a breach of an implied warranty despite
lack of privity of contract between the parties. Hcnningscn v. Bloornmfild
2Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
The rule prevailing in most jurisdictions requires privity of contract for
maintenance of breach of warranty actions. In recent times, this requirement
has been subject by many courts to sharp scrutiny and criticism.e These courts
have invoked changing economic and social conditions as reasons for rejecting
the privity doctrine.3 The cases which first allowed recovery despite lack of
privity were largely in the food and drug field. 4 They were characterized as
an exception to the general rule.; Yet some states have been recalcitrant in
as long as the buildings remained standing and in use. Id. at 246, 164 lN.E2d at 035, 196
N.Y.S.2d at 950. In view of the strong public policy favoring untrammelcd u:2 of land,
the court might subsequently be required to supplement its "touch and conce"an ' tect with
an additional criterion of reasonable duration. The court, however, gave no intimation of
what it would consider an undue burden upon land.
1. Decision unreported.
2. Mladouros v. Kansas City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 230 Mo. App. 275, 90 S.W.2d 445
(1936); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1953);
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd p2r curiam on rchearing,
16S Wash. 465, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), aff'd on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P2d 1G
(1934); Alazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913). For an excellent
study of the entire area, see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 Yale LJ. 1099 (1960).
3. The court in the Madouros case, stated that "under modern conditions, when products
... have been prepared under the exclusive supervision of the manufacturer and the
consumer must take them as they are supplied, the reprezmetations constitute an implied
w..
warranty, to the unknown and helpless consumer ... ." 230 Mo. App. at 2S3, QD S.W.
2d at 450.
4. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, S3 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094 (1957); Klen
v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P2d 799 (1939); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 1S9 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 332 (1920); Curtiss Candy Co. v. Johnson, 163 Mirts.
426, 141 So. 762 (1932); Davis v. Radford, 233 N.C. 2S3, 63 S.E.2d 822 (1951); Gcihnez3
v. Scow Bay Packing Co., 16 Wash. 2d 1, 132 P.2d 740 (1942); Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,
75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913). See also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-16 (195G), which
provides that an "implied warranty shall extend to the purchaser and to all par-ons for
whom such food or drink is intended."
S. See Rachlin v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 96 Fad 597 (2d Cir. 1933); Hofins v.
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going even this far. 6 Other courts have moved swiftly into broader areas,
holding absence of privity no bar to recovery in actions for breach of warranty
9
in the sale of soap detergents, 7 exploding bottles, 8 inflammable cowboy suits,
2
automobiles, 10 home permanent-wave sets," and defective cinder blocks.'
A variety of theories has been advanced to explain the legal basis of liability
of the manufacturer in absence of privity. Some courts permit recovery on the
ground that the plaintiff is a third party beneficiary.' 3 Other courts reason4
that a warranty runs with a product much as a covenant runs with land.1
Another view would impose liability on the manufacturer by making the dealer
the former's agent. 15 The theory, however, which has been received with the
greatest acceptance is that public policy, in light of modern marketing conditions, requires the recognition of a warranty made directly to the consumer. 10
Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Hertzler v. Manshum, 228 Mich. 416, 200
N.W. 155 (1924); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942);
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., supra note 4.
6. Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935); Lombardi v. California Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955); Cohan v. Associated Fur Farms,
Inc., 261 Wis. 584, 53 N.W.2d 788 (1952). Although New York has been reluctant to find
liability on the part of the manufacturer without privty of contract even in food and drug
cases, recovery was allowed despite absence of privity in Blessington v. McCrory Stores
Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953). But see Gimenez v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
264 N.Y. 390, 191 N.E. 27 (1934); Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576
(1923); Burke v. Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 942, 181
N.Y.S.2d 800 (3d Dep't 1959).
7. Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
8. Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 46 Ohio Op. 250, 102 N.E.2d 281 (C.P.
1951).
9. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
10. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939); Baxter
v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932). See generally Gillam, Products
Liability in the Automobile Industry: A Study in Strict Liability and Social Control 83-100
(1960).
11. Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958);
Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 149 N.E.2d 181 (1958).
12. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d
873 (1958).
13. E.g., Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928).
14. E.g., Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N.W. 48 (1937); Coca-Cola Bottling
Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
15. Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N.E. 557 (1928). See also
Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. at 687, 288 N.W. at 313. It has also been
held that the dealer is the agent of the consumer in purchasing from the manufacturer.
Wisdom v. Morris Hardware Co., 151 Wash. 86, 274 Pac. 1050 (1929). A complete survey
of theories circumventing the doctrine of privity can be found in Prosser, The Assault Upon
the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
16. Williams v. Campbell Soup Co., 80 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Mo. 1948); Patargias v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947); Worley v. Procter &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.,
168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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Breach of warranty was originally an action in tort. Later, the action became
one of a purely contractual nature, and courts, following basic contract theory,
required privity for recovery in breach of warranty actions. 17 But privity was
not always limited solely to contracts. Before the case of Thalas v. Winchester,'s and more recently MacPherson v. Budck Motor Co.,19 privity was
essential to a successful action against a manufacturer for negligence. Today,
lack of privity is no longer fatal in most cases to an action against a negligent
manufacturer. An analogy has been drawn between the decisions discrediting

the privity doctrine in breach of warranty actions and the MacPhcrson case.

'3

It is insisted that there is no valid distinction for retaining privitv in the one

and not the other. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the ordinary buyer does
not, and is not expected to, buy goods exclusively for his own consumptive

use.2 It is on this assumption that manufacturers advertize and market their
products. Thus, where the products sold are such that they will be dangerous

if defectively manufactured, then "society's interests can only be protected by
eliminating the requirement of privity between the maker and his dealers and
the reasonably expected ultimate consumer.'- An implied warranty of merchantability is imposed upon the manufacturer
in the instant case despite lack of privity between the parties. The court noted
that limitations in privity in the sale of goods developed at a time when
marketing conditions were not very complex.- 3 With the advent of the modern
economic phenomenon of mass production, the manufacturer effected his sales
through intermediaries, becoming more remote from the purchaser. Judge
Francis, writing the opinion in the instant case, observed yet another factor
17. In this connection Williston states: "Much of the intrinsic difficulty and Etill more
of the divergence of authority which characterize the law of warranty are due to an imperfect recognition of the nature of the obligation imposed by a warranty.... It may hbe
called an obligation either on a quasi-contract or a quasi-tort, because remcdie3 appropriate
to contract and also to tort have been applicable. That this is the character of the 2llcr s
obligation was recognized by Blackstone, and that this point of view has been l'q Eight
of by many courts is no doubt due to the fact that assumpit became so generally the
remedy for the enforcement of a warranty." 1 Williston, Sales § 197 (rev. ed. 1943). Szealso Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mlfg. Co., 241 Mlo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952);
Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 2b5, 149 N.E2d 181 (1953).
13. 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
19.

217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

20. One author has commented that "only time will tell whether the rule of no warranty vithout privity is destined to meet the same end (as negligence), but it ib at least
arguable that Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. [16S Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 4G9 (1932)] occupies the
same position in the history of the warranty cases that Thomas v. Wvinchozter [6 N.Y. 397
(1852)] fills in the development of liability for negligence. If it does, warranty awaits its
MacPherson--or rather its Cardozo." Gillam, Products Liability in the Automobile Industry: A Study in Strict Liability and Social Control S6 (1960).
21. 32 N.J. 35S, 378-79, 161 A.2d 69, SO-S1 (1960); Spence v. Three Rivers Buildcrs &
Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mlich. 120, 131-34, 90 N.W_2d S73, 379-S0 (1953).
22. 32 N.J. at 379, 161 A.2d at S1.
23. Id. at 379, 161 A.2d at SO.
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for the evolution of a separate system of independent dealers. With the downfall of caveat emptor, "many manufacturers took steps to avoid these ever
increasing warranty obligations. '24 They ceased selling their products directly
to the consuming public through their own employees. Manufacturers instead
transferred to the dealers the burdens imposed by the Sales Act by selling
directly to the latter. But such practices, coupled with large-scale advertising
by manufacturers to promote the purchase of these goods by the consuming
public "provided a basis upon which the existence of express or implied warranties was predicated, even though the manufacturer was not a party to the
'25
contract of sale."
It might be argued that courts should look through the so-called "independent" status of the dealer and impose liability on the manufacturer by
reason of a principal-agent relationship. In the present case, however, the
court dismissed this contention, holding the manufacturer liable irrespective
of any agency relationship. 26
In rejecting the doctrine of privity, another problem arises concerning the
extent to which the courts will go in holding the manufacturer liable. In this
case, for example, there existed a question as to the theory upon which the
wife was allowed recovery. The court stated that the wife is entitled to an
award since "she is such a person who ... might be expected to become a user
of the automobile. '2 7 Hence, both the automobile manufacturer and the
dealer extend an implied warranty of merchantability to the "purchaser of
the car, members of his family, and to other persons occupying or using it
with his consent.1 28 This view is2 9 somewhat similar to the test of foresecability
applied in the MacPlierson case.
It is to be noted that it is an implied warranty, not an express warranty,
that the manufacturer is giving to the ultimate consumer. Some courts have held,
by a mistaken assumption, that the giving of an express warranty excludes
an implied warranty.3 0 The court here, however, imposed an implied warranty
on the manufacturer even though he had given an express warranty to the
purchaser. Indeed, this case is the first to allow recovery against an automobile
manufacturer on the implied warranty theory without privity of contract.8 '
This is all the more significant in that the express warranty here was accompanied by a disclaimer and limitation clause. The court, in holding the clause
24. Id. at 372, 161 A.2d at 77.
25. Id. at 373, 161 A.2d at 77.
26. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
27. Id. at 413, 161 A.2d at 99-100.
28. Id. at 414, 161 A.2d at 100. Compare this language with Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-318.
29. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
30. E.g., Springer v. Indianapolis Brewing Co., 126 Ga. 321, 55 S.E. 53 (1906); Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
31. Two other cases allowed recovery on an express warranty theory without privity
of contract. Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939);
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 (1932).
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ineffective, rested its decision on a realistic appraisal of the status of the contracting parties. A buyer in need of a car is frequently not in a position to
shop around for better terms since all major manufacturers use the same
clauses.32 Hence, the purchaser must agree to the disclaimer in order to obtain
the car. The court remedied this situation by nullifying the disclaimer clause.
Mlany injustices are caused by a doctrine which, within the modem economic
framework, has outlived its usefulness. Privity has become a refuge for manufacturers seeking to avoid the burdens and responsibilities which in the interests of social justice they should not be allowed to escape. It is submitted that
when a manufacturer uses high-pressured advertizing and the communication
media to sell his products, he is, in effect, making promises to the ultimate
purchaser in the nature of warranties. Public policy demands that if the
manufacturer fails to carry out these promises, with consequent injury to innocent consumers, then the latter are entitled to be compensated. It is hoped
that in the near future other states will follow New Jersey in relaing the
harsh doctrine of privity.

Trade Regulation-Constitutionality of Nonsigner Clause in Resale Price

Maintenance.-Plaintiff company brought suit to restrain defendant, a retail
department store, from selling or offering for sale below the minimum fair-trade
price certain trade-mark commodities manufactured by plaintiff. The minimum
price had been "established" pursuant to Section 325.12 of the Minnesota
Fair Trade Act,' via plaintiff manufacturer's contract with two Minnesota
retailers. The price stipulation operated upon those with notice thereof, even
though not parties to the agreement. The district court granted the injunction.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, declaring the nonsigner
provision to be an unlawful delegation of legislative power in violation of the
Minnesota Constitution. 2 Re ington Arms Co. v. G. E. M., Inc., - Minn. -,
102 N.WT.2d 52S (1960).
Resale price maintenance, the practice of fixing the price at which one person

32. The warranty in the instant case is the uniform warranty of the Automobile M1anufacturers Association, whose members include General Motors, Chrysler, Ford, StudebakerPackard, Checker Motors Corp., and American Motors. Thus Judge Francis in the prezmt
case remarked: "The gross inequality of bargaining position occupied by the consumr in
the automobile industry is thus apparent. There is no competition among the car maers
in the area of the express warranty. Where can the buyer go to negotiate for better
protection?" 32 N.J. at 391, 161 A.2d at S7.
1. Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 325.03 to .14 (1947).

Section 325.12, the nonsigner claue,

proNides: "Xillfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity
at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the proviions of
[this act] . . . whether the person so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or ib not
a party to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any perzon
damaged thereby."

2. Minn. Const. art. 3, § 1; art. 4, § 1.
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must sell a commodity to another at a different level of the distribution system,
has been sanctioned by the fair-trade provisions enacted by the various state
legislatures. The backbone of every fair-trade law is the nonsigner clause, by
which an individual not a party to a price-fixing contract may be bound by its
terms. The nonsigner provision authorizes agreements between manufacturers
and retailers of trade-marked or branded commodities, whereby the latter not
only bind themselves but, in effect, freeze the commodity price, binding all
retailers throughout the state.
In the celebrated case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co,3 the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that all resale price maintenance agreements in interstate commerce were violative of the Sherman AntiTrust Act. However, the same Court, in Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. SeagramDistillers Corp.,4 upheld a state statute authorizing resale price maintenance
agreements as an appropriate means for protecting the good will attached to a
producer's trade-mark. Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Miller-Tydings
Act, 5 exempting fair-trade legislation from the previous prohibitions of the
Sherman Act. In 1951, however, in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers
Corp.,6 the Court jeopardized effective fair-trade legislation by construing the
Miller-Tydings Act as shielding only consensual agreements from the antitrust
laws. This decision. exposed the controversial nonsigner clause to the statutory
prohibtions on restraint of trade. In an attempt to bypass the effect of
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., the McGuire Act was enacted, 7
expressly adding nonsigner enforcement to the federal antitrust exemption
earlier conferred.
Relying upon Old Dearborn,many states passed fair-trade laws. The courts,
following the rationale of this decision, held such legislation constitutional. In
recent years, however, there has been a decided trend in the opposite direction.
Nonsigner provisions have been declared unconstitutional in sixteen states.8
The split in authority evidenced by these cases is clear-cut and uncompromis3. 220 u.s. 373 (1911). The Court found that a system of contracts between manufacturers and wholesale and retail merchants, which sought to control sale prices of such
dealers by fixing the amount the consumer should pay, amounted to an unlawful restraint of trade, invalid at common law, and, so far as interstate commerce was affected,
invalid under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
4. 299 U.S. 183 (1936). The Court, in holding a state fair-trade law constitutional,
stated that the law's "sole purpose . . . is to afford a legitimate remedy for an injury to
the good will which results from the use of trade-marks, brands or names... " Id. at 198.
5. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C § 1 (1958).
6. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
7. 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958), which legalizes state nonsigner provisions
in interstate commerce where such provisions are valid components of a state fair-trade
law.
3003. The highest courts of Arkansas, Colorado, Florida,
8. 2 Trade Reg. Rep.
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia have declared the nonsigner clause
unconstitutional. See notes 10-12 infra.
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ing. The difference between the two lines of decisions is the acceptance or rejection of the reasoning advanced by the Supreme Court in Old Dearborn. At
the present time, the cases which do not accept Old Dearborn represent the
dynamic force in the fair-trade area.
In Old Dearborn, the United States Supreme Court rejected the contention
that the nonsigner clause of a state fair-trade law was a price-fixing provision
which had the effect of denying to the owner of property, within the scope of
the statute, the right to determine for himself the price at which he would
sell. The Court reasoned that the nonsigner clause was not a restriction on the
commodity, but rather a restraint on the use of the trade-mark or brand of
the producer by which such goods were known. The essence of the violation,
therefore, consisted not in the bare disposition of the product but in a prohibited
use of the trade-mark or brand which was still the producer's property. The
so-called property interest in the trade-mark or the goodwill of the brand name
became the "polite fiction" of Old Dearborn. This line of reasoning has been
the basis for the vast majority of state decisions holding fair-trade and nonsigner proxisions to be within the ambit of their respective state constitutions 0
The courts opposed to the nonsigner clause have invariably attacked the
property interest fiction of the Supreme Court, although the specific grounds
for declaring the proxisions unconstitutional have varied. The theories most
often adopted are: (1) vdolation of due process of law;lu (2) denial of equal
protection of the laws; 1 ' and (3) unlawful delegation of legislative power.'2
9. See, e.g., Alax Factor & Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P.2d 177 (1936 ; General
Elec. Co. v. Klein, 34 Del. Ch. 491, 106 A2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1954); General Etce. Co. v.
Kimball Jewelers, Inc., 333 Mlass. 665, 132 N.E.2d 652 (1956); Bourjois Sales Corp. v.
Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 7 N.E.2d 30 (1937); Lionel Corp. v. Grayzon-Robinson Stores,
Inc., 15 NJ. 191, 104 A.2d 304 (1954).
10. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. White River Distribs., 224 Ark. 553, 275 SW.2d
455 (1955); Olin 'Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956);
Cox v. General Elec., Co., 211 Ga. 2S6, 85 S.E.2d 514 (1955); BisMdU Carpet Sw~ccp2r Co. v.
Shane Co., 237 Ind. 1SS, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957); General Elee. Co. v. American Buyer.
Co-op., 316 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 195s); Dr. G. E. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwe mann
Bros. Giant Super MIkts., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956); Shakespe-are Co. v. Lippman's
Tool Shop Sporting Goods Co., 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W.2d 26S (1952); McGraw Elcc. Co.
v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 6S N.W.2d 603 (1955); Slmggs Drug Center v.
General Elec. Co., 63 NM. 215, 315 P.2d 967 (1957); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Bargain Fair, Inc., 167 Ohio St. 1S2, 147 N.E.2d 431 (195S); General Elcc. Co. v. Wabtk
207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956); Rogers-Kent, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 231 S.C. 636,
99 S.E.2d 665 (1957); General Elec. Co. v. A. Dandy Appliance Co., - IV. Va. -, 103
S.E.2d 310 (195S).
11. McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 63 N.W.2d C603
(1955); General Elec. Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 296 P.2d 635 (1956).
12. Olin Mlathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956); BL:2U
Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Shane Co., 237 Ind. 133, 143 N.E.2d 415 (1957); Quality Oil Co.
v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 1S2 Kan. 43, 322 P.2d 731 (195S); Dr. G. H. Tichenor
Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkhts., 231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956);
McGraw Elec. Co. v. Lewis & Smith Drug Co., 159 Neb. 703, 63 N.W2d C03 (1955); Remington Arms Co. v. Skaggs, - Wash. 2d -, 345 P.2d 10S5 (1959).
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The Minnesota court relied upon the third theory. The nonsigner clause was
found to constitute an unlawful delegation to private persons of an arbitrary
right to fix future prices for brand name commodities, and, therefore, to bind
nonparty retailers and consumers without the safeguard of a hearing or review,
or compliance with any legislative standard. The rationale of the decision
paralleled the reasoning underlying previous condemnations of nonsigner provisions as unconstitutional grants of legislative power.
In Dr. G. H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super
Mkts., 13 the court, referring to a nonsigner clause as a price-fixing law, held the
provision invalid as an unlawful delegation of power to fix prices, which power
"to regulate private business by coercive price fixing is a legislative function
which may be invoked only . . . when the measure is seen to have a reasonable
relation to the public welfare and is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. '14 The
court stated that it would "not hesitate to strike down legislation vesting in
private persons the right to determine the state of things upon which the effect
of the law depends as this is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form." '
The court was unequivocally opposed to any grant of power without safeguard
to the individual and, as in the present case, could under no circumstances see
any economic justification for the statute.
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis6 also treated the clause as a pricefixing law, holding it to be invalid per se since it vested in a private person
the right to determine the time and conditions upon which the effect of the law
depends. The court considered the grant of power to be so arbitrary as to be
17
even beyond the power of the legislature itself.
Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.' 8 found that power to
fix rates or prices binding upon all, irrespective of their consent, was a legislative power which cannot be abdicated. The grant of power to the manufacturer
was held to be so arbitrary and without safeguard' 0 as to amount to what
Mr. Justice Cardozo had formerly termed "delegation running riot."20 Quality
Oil Co. also adopted the theory advanced in Olin Mathieson that such statutes,
although purportedly enacted to benefit the public, are actually designed to aid
the manufacturer by allowing him alone to price-fix and bind nonsigners. 21
13.

231 La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956).

14.
15.

Id. at 66, 90 So. 2d at 348.
Id. at 65, 90 So. 2d at 348.

16.
17.
18.

134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956).
Id. at 176, 301 P.2d at 147.
182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958).

19. "A trade-mark owner is thus empowered to determine whether the provisions of tho
law, i.e., the nonsigner clause, shall be placed into operation, and . . . to what commodities it shall apply and what minimum prices it shall make binding on nonsigning parties,
and is also empowered to amend or alter the operation of the law by changing minimum
prices, by eliminating or adding commodities, and fixing minimum prices for thoso added.
In short, the trade-mark owner is privileged to place the law into effect and to amend or
alter it at his whim or caprice." Id. at 496, 322 P.2d at 737.
20. Ibid., citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935).
21. Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 182 Kan. 488, 497, 322 P.2d
731, 738 (1958).
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In Remington Arms v. Skaggs,22 as in the above mentioned decisions, the court
questioned the economic reasonableness of the nonsigner provision, stating that
what was described as price-fixing by coercion in Sclrwegmann Bros. v. Calvcrt
Distillers Corp. was still compulsory price-fixing under any nonsigner dause. It should be noted, however, that the first premise of any such argument is the
destruction of the reasoning in Old Dearborn, thus opening the way for treatment of the clause as a price-fixing provision. 21 The courts here and in the
instant case have, therefore, approached the problem in a radically different
manner than did the Court in Old Dearborn. They did not attack the law of
Old Dearborn, but rather the fundamental premise, the "property interest,"
upon which the decision was based.
Although aware of the reasons for fair-trade acts and the differences in
opinion as to their economic soundness, the court in the principal case made
no attempt to reconcile the existing conflict in authorities. Rather, it advocated
a more realistic appraisal of the nonsigner act itself. Viewing the act in the
context of our present economic climate, the court rejected the ostensible justification of the act as protection of trade name good will. It found the act's true
character to be selective price control, leaving the manufacturer of trade-mark
products the arbitrary right to determine when and if the act shall take effecLteWhile it would appear that the court's realistic appraisal of the merits or demerits of fair trade is reasonably accurate, it is almost impossible to reconcile
the court's delegation argument with such United States Supreme Court decisions as Sznshine Antzracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,- Yahus v.United States,
and American Power & Light Co. v. SEC.2 There was no unfettered discretion
for the manufacturer to make law here. Indeed, no legislative function was
involved. The right to make law had not been abdicated by the legislature.
Rather, it had enacted a complete law. The individual manufacturer received
only an option to bring himself within its ambit if his product were trade-marked
and in free and open competition.2
22. - Wash. 2d -, 345 P.2d 1035 (1959).
23. Id. at -, 345 P.2d at 10S6.
24. The Washington court, in considering the effects of fair trade, quoted Gzncral Elcc.
Co. v. Wahle, 207 Ore. 302, 322, 296 P-2d 635, 645 (1956). "From the facts and attialc3
given, the accuracy of which seem beyond question, it is plainly appar.nt that the consumer
is not benefited ... . [lit is obvious that the whole scheme of the Fair Trade Acts is one
for private, rather than public, gain. . . 2' Id. at -, 345 P.2d at 1037-2S.
25. "[It must be conceded that he is given the privilege to place the law in effect and
to amend or alter it at his will. He may do this without regard to the intcrcct or welfare
of nonsigners or the consumer who represents the public. The law deez not provide for
any standard or condition as to the necessity for the act. It gives to the tradc.rmark
102
owner carte blanche authority to make that determination alone.' - limn. at -,
N.W.2d at 534-35.
26. 310 U.S. 3S1 (1940).
27.

321 U.S. 414 (1944).

2S.

329 U.S. 90 (1946).

29. See Corning Glass Works v. M1ax Dichter Co.,

-

N.H. -, 161 A.2d 569, 574 (1%9O),

where the court upheld the validity of the New Hampshire nonigner clause. S-z INE.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 357:1-4 (1955).
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In determining whether such statutes are arbitrary grants of power to private
individuals, numerous courts have decided the reasonableness of the delegation
only through a thorough perusal of the economic facts of fair trade. The
Supreme Court did so in Old Dearborn. Since it found the question to be
debatable, however, it accepted and carried into effect the determination of the
state legislature. 30 Here, the Minnesota court focused realistically on the effects
of such legislation in our present day economy, and found the act unreasonably
destructive of consumer interests and violative of the personal liberty and
private property rights of nonsigning retailers. It is clear that the court was
concerned with the wisdom of the legislation. Such is not a judicial function.
The only question the court had the right to consider was the power of the
legislature to enact the statute. The wisdom or economic desirability of the
legislation was irrelevant to the issue of legislative power.
However questionable might be the court's right to make the appraisal, the
validity of its contentions cannot be denied. The consumer is frequently neither
protected from nor benefited by such legislation; the law becomes operative at
the manufacturer's option; and, when enacted, a manufacturer and retailer
have the power to fix prices in accordance with their own interest. It is inimical
to sound legislative functioning to entrust one person with power to regulate
the business of another, especially a competitor. The very existence of fairtrade acts, and, in particular, the federal statutory exemptions, conflicts with
the basic philosophy of our national antitrust policy. The throttling of price
competition in the process of distribution protected by fair trade is an inevitable
result of such legislation. Moreover, as indicated in the instant case, fair trade
facilitates horizontal price-fixing at all levels. Fair trade, to say the least, has
spawned many evils.3 1 There exists no compelling reason why such power
should be granted to private persons at the sacrifice of safeguards to both the
unwilling retailer and the consumer. Consequently, the wisdom of fair-trade
laws should be reconsidered by state legislatures. The question does not belong
with the courts.

Trusts-Apportionment of Dividend Between Trust Corpus and Income
Under the Osborne Rule.-A trust estate created in 1915 held 26,500 shares
of the stock of Standard Oil of Indiana and 4,100 shares of the stock of BorgWarner. During the term of the trust, these companies effected an extraordinary stock distribution. In each instance, the company transferred to its
capital stock account its entire capital surplus and sufficient earned surplus
to support the additional shares at their par value in the capital stock account. Since the trust had been created prior to the effective date of Section
30. Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp. 299 U.S. 183, 195-96 (1936).
31. Typical articles attacking fair trade may be found in Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 175 (1953); Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 Yale L.J. 23
(1955). For a summary of the case in favor of fair trade and answers to the objections,
see Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 Yale L.J. 967 (1955).
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17-a of the New York Personal Property Law,' the additional shares were to
be apportioned between principal and income according to the "intact value'
rule formulated in 1913 by the court of appeals in In the Matter of Osborne.2
The trustee applied to the shares involved the percentages in which earned
surplus and capital surplus had contributed in each case to the necessary supplementation of the capital stock account. That part of the shares which represented earned surplus it allocated to income, having determined that such
allocation would not violate the Osborne "intact value" formula. The part
representing capital surplus was added directly to the trust corpus.a Following
the death of the life tenant in 1955, the trustee brought a proceeding to settle
the accounts.' The New York Supreme Court reserved decision and settlement
of this allocation. Objections were filed by the executors of the life tenant,
and the court directed a reference.5 The appellate division struck the provision
for the reference and ordered the shares distributed according to the trustee's
formula.0 The court of appeals, two judges dissenting, affirmed. That part
of the total capitalization derived from capital surplus cannot be regarded as
a capitalization of earnings to be apportioned under the Osborne rule. In the
Matter of Bingham, 7 N.Y.2d 1, 163 N.E.2d 301, 194 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1959).
The courts have long been perplexed by the problem of the allocation of
stock dividends between the life tenant and the remaindermen of a trust.7
The issue arises because, in most instances, the settlor of the trust does not
make known his intention as to how dividends are to be treated. In the absence of any stated intention, most jurisdictions have followed one of three
rules, named after the states of their origin. The Kentucky rule simply allocates any dividend declared out of earnings in its entirety to the parties entitled to income at the time the dividend is declared, no matter what the
source or the form of the dividend or the time when the fund out of which it
is declared was earned. 8 The Massachusetts rule considers all stock dividends
1. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17-a. The effective date was May 17th, 1926. This cection
adopts the Massachusetts rule. See text accompanying note 9 infra.
2. 209 N.1. 450, 103 N.E. 723 (1913). See note 20 infra.
3. Standard Oil transferred $405,746,400 to its capital stock account, of which 43.0355
was charged to capital surplus. The balance, 56.9655, was charged to earned surplus. The
trustee ascertained that an award of 56.965% of the new shares, or 15,095.73 sbarct, to
income would not impair the "intact value" of the trust principal, and the award was so
made. The balance, 11,404.27 shares, was awarded to principal.
Borg-Warner transferred $25,402,0SS to its capital stock account, of which $21,340,734,
was cbarcd to
or 84.011S%, was charged to capital surplus. The balance, 15.9532,

earned surplus. The trustee ascertained that an award of 1.9SS.,, or 1,311 charc , to
income would not impair the "intact value" of the principal, and the award was so made.
The remainder, or 6,SS9 shares, was awarded to principal.
4. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 1308, 1310.
5. In the Matter of Payne, 11 Misc. 2d 367, 161 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. CL 1957).
6. 4 App. Div. 2d 937, 167 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Ist Dep't 1957) (memorandum dccison).
7. 'Few legal questions present greater intrinsic difficulties, or have called forth a greater
contrariety of iews and opinions, as well as of practical results, than the one now under
consideration... ." Annot., 12 L.R-A. 769 (1903).
S. Hite v. Hite, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 773 (1S92). See Annot., 130 A.L.R. 492 (1941).
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as principal for the remaindermen and all cash or property dividends as income
belonging to the life tenant. 9 The Pennsylvania rule inquires as to the time
when the fund out of which the dividend is declared was earned, holding that
the remaindermen are entitled to retain in the principal all that is earned prior
to the creation of the trust, while the income beneficiary is entitled to all that
is earned after that time. 10
New York has followed all three rules. The Pennsylvania rule, adopted in
Osborne," supplanted the Kentucky rule, which had been followed since In
the Matter of Kernochan.22 In 1926 the legislature enacted Section 17-a of
the Personal Property Law, embodying the Massachusetts rule.18 However,
the statutory change was not retroactive, so that all trusts created prior to
14
1926 are still governed by the rule of Osborne.
The trust in Osborne, created in 1908, consisted of 3,000 shares of the stock
of the Singer Manufacturing Company. At the time of the trust's creation the
company's capital stock was $30,000,000 and its surplus of accumulated earnings amounted to $37,604,206. In June 1910, the surplus had risen to over
$51,500,000. In that month, the stockholders voted to retain $30,000,000 of
the surplus as additional working capital, increasing the capital stock account
to $60,000,000. A dividend of $30,000,000 was declared out of the increase,
the trust receiving 2,920 shares of the new stock. The question arose whether
the life tenant should receive the whole dividend' 0 or whether it should be
apportioned between the beneficiary and the trust corpus.
The court distinguished between ordinary and extraordinary stock dividends.
Ordinary dividends are deemed to have been earned at the date of their declaration, but an adherence to this rule in the case of "extraordinary and unusual
dividends declared in whole or in part from earnings actually accumulated prior
to the creation of the trust or the purchase of the stock . . . in many cases
shocks the sense of justice."'10 The court then formulated these rules:
1. Ordinary dividends, regardless of the time when the surplus out of which they
are payable was accumulated, should be paid to the life beneficiary of the trust.
2. Extraordinary dividends, payable from the accumulated earnings of the company,
whether payable in cash or stock, belong to the life beneficiary, unless they entrench
9. Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868).
10. Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927); Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368

(1857).
11. 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723, 823 (1913).
12. 104 N.Y. 618, 11 N.E. 149 (1887).
13. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
14. See In the Matter of Hagen, 262 N.Y. 301, 186 N.E. 792 (1933); Equitable Trust
Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 164 N.E. 723 (1928).
15. The appellate division affirmed an award of the entire distribution to the life tenant
on the basis of earlier cases, particularly Robertson v. de Brulatour, 188 N.Y. 301, 80 N.E.
938 (1907); Lowry v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 172 N.Y. 137, 64 N.E. 796 (1902); and
McLouth v. Hunt, 154 N.Y. 179, 48 N.E. 548 (1897). The court noted, however, that "If
this were an open question," it would apportion the shares between the life tenant
and the remaindermen. 153 App. Div. 312, 315, 138 N.Y. Supp. 18, 20 (2d Dep't 1912).
16. 209 N.Y. at 477, 103 N.E. at 731.
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in whole or in part upon the capital of the trust fund as received from the testator
or maker of the trust or invested in the stock, in which case such extraordinary
dividends should be returned to the trust fund or apportioned between the trust
fund and
the life beneficiary in such a way as to preserve the integrity of the trust
7
fund.'
In Osborne, the court did not give a thorough explanation of the theory
behind its decision. Its theory, if any, was embodied in two extensive quotations
from text writers.' s In both instances, the writers discussed the Pennsyliania
rule, which they expressed in terms of the time of accumulation of the fund.
When speaking of extraordinary dividends, however, the court made no mention of the time of accumulation but only of "preserving the integrity of the
trust fund." Consequently, what is the basis of the rule?
The Osborne court awarded a certain percentage of the stock to the income
beneficiary and the remainder to the capital of the trust fund. No computations were included in the opinion or appended to it so as to indicate how the
figure was ascertained. It has been said that it was based upon "the ratio of
the amount of surplus that had accumulated before and the amount that had
accumulated after the commencement of the life interest . . . .1 The basis
seems, then, to be derived from the time of accumulation theory. Whatever
the basis, the figure was changed on a motion to amend a remittitur. The
court stated: "The proposition decided by us in this case is, that in all cases
of extraordinary dividends, either of money or stock, sufficient of the dividend
must be retained in the corpus of the trust to maintain that corpus unimpaired
and the remainder thereof must be awarded to the life beneficiary"' 3 In the
course of developing the "intact value" formula, under which emphasis is
placed on "maintaining the corpus unimpaired," the court made only passing
reference to the time of accumulation theory.
The Osborne rule next arose in the New York Court of Appeals in United
States Trst Co. v. Heyei- where it was argued that, according to Osborne,
17. Ibid.
13. Id. at 475-76, 103 N.. at 730-31, citing 2 Cook, Corporations § 552 (6th cd. 103),
and 7 Thompson, Corporations § 5414 (2d ed. 1915).
19. Annot., 130 A.L.R. 492, 546 n.14 (1941).
20. In the Matter of Osborne, 209 N.Y. 4S4, 435, 103 N.E. 823 (1913). To accomplih
this result, the court set forth the "intact value" formula: "The intrin.ic value of the trust
investment is to be ascertained by dividing the capital and the surplus of the corporation
eaisting at the time of the creation of the trust by the numb:r of sharcz ... then outstanding, which gives the value of each share, and that amount must be multiplicd by
the number of shares held in the trust. The value of the investment rcpr:c ntcd by the
original shares after the dividend has been made is ascertained by exactly the same method.
The difference between the two shows the impairment of the corpus of the tru:t. If the
dividend is of money the amount of that difference is to be retained by the trust1c as
capital, and the remainder paid to the life beneficiary. If the dividend is in stoc% the
amount of impairment in money must be divided by the intrinsic value of a ,hare of the
new stock, and the quotient gives the number of shares to be rctained to make the impairment good-the remaining shares going to the life beneficiary. Mlarhct value, good
will and like considerations cannot be considered in apportioning a dividend." Ibid.
21. 224 N.Y. 242, 120 N.E. 645 (1913).
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the value of the trust principal was forever fixed at the time of the creation of
the trust, and that all subsequent increases of value, of whatever kind, belonged to the income beneficiaries. The court rejected this argument. "While
the corpus of the fund may not be depleted, yet the corpus may accumulate
or increase, and until there is some division in the nature of a dividend payable
out of accumulated earnings or profits, there is nothing that can be awarded as
income to beneficiaries. '22 In every apportionment under the Osborne rule
subsequent to the Heye decision, the value to be kept intact has been the
value at the time of acquisition by the trust as augmented by any subsequent
natural increments through increased capital.2 3 The Heye court did not discuss
the basis of the Osborne decision.
Such a discussion came seven years later in Bourne v. Bourne,24 in which
Judge Andrews attempted to clarify the rule while admitting the difficulties in
administering it. He stated that "our main purpose has been to preserve intact
the capital of the trust estate, increased or decreased by any normal rise or
fall in values, assigning to the life tenant but the income therefrom." 25 This
certainly sounds like the "intact value" formula. How is this result obtained?
In other cases the directors have declared extraordinary cash dividends, payable
from surplus profits, or the effect of their action has been to transfer these profits
to capital, and to divide them in the form of shares. What we wish to do is clear.
These profits may have been made before the trust estate was created. Or after.
Or both before and after. Under the first and second contingencies the cash or
stock dividends go to the remainderman or to the life tenant respectively. Under
the last they should be divided between
the two in the proportion that the earnings
26
before bear to the earnings after.
This method is strikingly similar to the one employed in the first Osborne
opinion. It was followed in Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentie,27 wherein Chief
Judge Cardozo stated that "as between life beneficiary and remainderman a
stock dividend would be reckoned as principal or income according to the
origin of the surplus out of which it was declared. To the extent it distributed
a surplus existing at the creation of the trust, it would be allocated to principal;
to the extent that it
distributed a surplus earned thereafter, it would be
'28
allocated to income."
Chief Judge Cardozo made no mention of "intact value," nor, until the
instant case, had any other decision of the New York Court of Appeals. The
standard manner of explaining the Osborne rule, if undertaken at all, has been
22.

Id. at 253, 120 N.E. at 648. See Macy v. Ladd, 227 N.Y. 670, 125 N.E. 829 (1920).
See, e.g., In the Matter of Hagen, 262 N.Y. 301, 306, 186 N.E. 792, 793 (1933)
(subscription rights increase value of principal); Pratt v. Ladd, 253 N.Y. 213, 170 N.E.
895 (1930).
24. 240 N.Y. 172, 148 N.E. 180 (1925).
25. Id. at 175, 148 N.E. at 180-81.
26. Id. at 176, 148 N.E. at 181. (Emphasis added.)
27. 250 N.Y. 1, 164 N.E. 723 (1928).
28. Id. at 7-8, 164 N.E. at 723.
23.
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in terms of the time of accumulation.2 - It is in no way suggested that these
different possible bases of the rule are contradictory. They are, in fact, two
sides of the same coin. If the theory of the relative times of accumulation is
accepted as the basis of the Osborne decision, the "intact value" formula is
precisely the method by which those relative times are determined-or, at
least, it is the one method for reaching a result which would satisfy that
principle as closely as possible. As the majority in the instant case noted, it
is impossible to "trace specific dollars of earnings or of capital as they are
received and disbursed ... 2'"
The Osborne court, at least in its second opinion, did not ask for such a
search. Instead, it merely sought to compensate the trust corpus for whatever
dimunition the new dividend might cause in the book or intrinsic value of the
original shares as they were valued at the date of the creation of the trust.
By maintaining the value of the corpus as of that time (supplemented by natural
increments), the "intact value" formula equivalently retains in the principal
all surplus accumulated by the corporation prior to that time. Under the
formula, what remains after the corpus has been restored to its original value
represents what was accumulated after the creation of the trust.
The question raised by the instant case, however, is more fundamental. It
arises from the fact, noted by the minority, that the bookkeeping practice of
segregating "capital surplus" and "earned surplus" was introduced about 1920.
At the time of the Osborne decision, then, all surplus was in one account. The
minority concluded that the new practice should not control trust interests.
"Whether the surplus is in one account, generally denominated 'surplus,' or
in two accounts, denominated 'capital surplus' and 'earned surplus,' the apportionment under the Osborne-intact-value formula must be made in the same
way, with the same result on the respective property rights of the life beneficiary and of the remaindermen." 31 The minority, therefore, would apply the
"intact value" formula to the entire stock distributionP32
If the Osborne court meant to lay down a rule by which all manner of surplus was to be apportioned between principal and income, then the minority
here must be correct. But neither surplus nor earnings, under modern corporate practice, retain the simplicity of meaning they had when the Pennsylvania (Osborne) rule was first enunciated. 33 If the rule were meant to apportion
29. See In the Matter of Fosdick, 4 N.Y.2d 646, 654, 152 N.E.2d 223, 233, 176 N.Y.S2d
966, 972 (1958); Pratt v. Ladd, 253 N.Y. 213, 213, 170 N.E. 895, E97 (1930).

30. 7 N.Y.2d at 9, 163 N.E.2d at 304, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
31. Id. at 24, 163 N.E.2d at 313, 194 N.X.S.2d at 4.2.
32. Applied to the entire Standard Oil distribution, the "intact value" formub, as interpreted by the minority, would allocate the entire 26,500 shares to income or 11,40427 more
than awarded by the majority. Of the 3,200 shares in Borg-Warner, 4,463.9702 shares
would go to the corpus and 3,736.029S to income, of 2,425.0293 more than awarded by
the majority. Id. at 25, 163 N.E.2d at 313-14, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 432-3.
33. Cunningham Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 11, 149 A2d 72, 7S (1959). See Cohan and Dean,
Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary Apportionment of Stock Proceeds: The
Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 205 (1957). Thbe cource
suggest that not everything labelled "earnings" should be included in apportionment. "Instead, there should be room for the concept that accumulated [earned] surplus i lezz an
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only "earnings," 34 then the "intact value" formula as applied to all surplus cannot meet the assignment.
Beneath this dispute there is a difference between the majority and minority
opinions in their approach toward determining the probable intention of the
testator, which the Osborne rule was designed to further. The minority" starts
by accepting the view expressed by Chief Judge Cardozo, in Equitable Trust
Co. v. Prentice,36 that the primary benefit was intended to be conferred upon
the life beneficiary. It therefore declares that "all that the remaindermen
are entitled to is the original book value plus natural capital increments. The
income beneficiary is entitled to everything else."'37 The minority, therefore,
would give the whole dividend to income (to the extent that it does not impair
even where it capitalizes both capital profits and ordinary
"intact value")
38
earnings.
There is another side to this intention question, i.e., what benefit was intended by the testator. This involves an interpretation of general terms such
as "rents, issues, profits and incomes." 39 While not disputing the minority's
view about the intended recipient of the primary benefit, 40 the majority's
analysis of the intended subject matter of the benefit leads it to regard the
"intact value" formula as a "safeguard of the rights of principal and a limitation on the rights of income "4 1 and a "minimum figure below which the
corpus of the trust could not be reduced, not as a jumping-off place above which
income could claim everything .... *"42
The majority seems to stand on better ground, for the trend of the cases
has been to reduce the benefits received by the income beneficiary. By ordering
an apportionment, the Osborne decision itself had this effect, since under the
earlier rule the entire amount would have gone to the life tenant.43 The later
the claims of income by narrowing the concept of an
cases further curbed 44
"apportionable event" which would call the Osborne rule into play.41 The
income retention than it is a vehicle to replace capital equipment at constantly increasing
costs, thereby assuring future income which otherwise might be lost to the life tenant."
Cohan and Dean, op. cit. supra at 205-06.
34. The second Osborne opinion does not use the term "earnings," speaking only of

surplus. See note 20 supra. The first opinion uses both terms. See text accompanying
note 17 supra.
35. 7 N.Y.2d at 18, 163 N.E.2d at 310, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
36. 250 N.Y. 1, 8, 164 N.E. 723, 724 (1928).
37. 7 N.Y.2d at 24, 163 N.E.2d at 313, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
38. Ibid.
39. The trust in the instant case contained these terms. 7 N.Y.2d at 7, 163 N.E.2d at
303, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
40. It has been questioned elsewhere. See 3 Scott, Trusts § 235A (2d ed. 1956).
41. 7 N.Y.2d at 9, 163 N.E.2d at 304, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
42. Ibid.
43. See note 15 supra.

44. The term does not appear in the New York cases but has been used-by the Pennsylvania courts, e.g., Cunningham Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A.2d 72 (1959), and by writers, e.g.,
Cohan and Dean, op. cit. supra note 33.
45. In the Matter of Hagen, 262 N.Y. 301, 186 N.E. 792 (1933) (no apportionment on
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legislature has completed this movement by adopting the Mlassachuetts rule
declaring all stock dividends to be principal:'0
The courts have all agreed that the claim of income can be made only when
there has been a distribution in the nature of a dividend.4 7 A question implicit
in this case is whether a capital increment may also be distributed with a
dividend and retain its status as a capital increment.
Modern accounting practice regards capital surplus as more akin to capital
than earnings.4S Capital surplus may be derived generally from paid-in surplus, reappraisal surplus, surplus from restatement of capital stock, and surplus
from the sale of reacquired shares. 9 Here the majority saw only one situation
under which capital surplus may have its origin in earnings. The New York
Stock Exchange requires that the earned surplus account be charged with the
market value of stock distributed through a dividend, ') with the excess of market
value over par value being transferred to capital surplus. Since, as an ordinary
stock dividend, the shares originally capitalized would go to the income beneficiary, if the resulting capital surplus were then used to capitalize an extraordinary dividend, "the award of any such stock to income would actually
represent a double distribution to the income beneficiary of the identical earnings!" 51 No justification appears, therefore, for regarding the distribution of
capital surplus as falling under the claim of the income beneficiary.
The question presented to the New York courts in the earlier cases construing
subscription rights); United States Trust Co. v. Heye, 224 N.Y. 242, 120 N.E. C45 .(1913)
(no apportionment of preacquired holdings); In the 'Matter of Lisbcrger, 109 Mizce. 277,
71 N.Y.S.2d 5S5 (Surr. Ct. 1947), aff'd mer., 273 App. Div. S31, 73'N.YS.2d 199 (It Dzp't),
motion for leave to appeal denied, 29S N.Y. 934 (1943) (no apportionment on cte: split).
46. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17-a.
47. United States Trust Co. v. Heye, 224 N.Y. 242, 254, 120 N.E. 645, C43 (1913);
Baker v. Thompson, 131 App. Div. 469, 472, 16S N.Y. Supp. 371, S73 (1st Dzp't), ali'd
mem., 224 N.Y. 592, 120 N.E. 853 (1913). Even where there have bccn tranwfcr from
earned surplus to capital and a stock split declared two years later, the distribution ha
been held nonapportionable since there was no intention to declare a dividend at the time
the transfer was made. In the Matter of Strong, 193 li-c. 7, 96 N.Y.S.2d 75 (Surr. Ct.),
aff'd mem., 277 App. Div. 1157, 101 N.Y.S.2d 1021 (4th Dcp't 1950).
To equate the type of problem involved here with that of the distinctln betwcn a
stock dividend and a stock split is to invite confusion. For some purpo:=, at MArt,any
distribution characterized by a permanent retention of carnings in the businez through
formal transfer of earned surplus is a dividend, even if the Eharc ditributcd rcprzent
only in part the earnings thus retained. See, e.g., In the Matter of Davi:, 11 Misfc. 2d
372, 373, 123 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (Surr. CL 1953). This ev.ades the question to ba decided,
however, in an Osborne apportionment. See In the Matter of Sanford, 4 Misc. 2d 437, 161
N.Y.S.2d 507 (Surr. Ct. 1957), where the court agreed that such a diribution (including
the same Standard Oil distribution involved in Bin.ham) vas a dividend, and procccc-d
to apportion it, as here. The dividend split terminology is used in the prezent case by the
minority but never mentioned by the majority.
49. Am. Institute of Accounting, Accounting Recearch Bull. No. 43, ch. 1, at 11 (1953).
49. Sanders, Hatfield & Moore, A Statement of Accounting Principles 93-94 (1933).
50. New York Stock Exchange, Company Manual § A-13, at A-235 (Aug. 15, 1955).
51. 7 N.Y2d at 11, 163 N.E.2d at 305, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
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the Osborne rule was fundamentally whether the corporation had distributed
capital or earnings. The court now has recognized that the coiporation may
distribute both at once. The modern bookkeeping practice of segregating
capital surplus and earned surplus, even though initiated after Osborne, offers
an opportunity of more nearly realizing the intention of that decision than
had been before possible. The New York courts have long complained about
the Osborne rule 5 2 and the legislature has confined it to trusts created before
1926.53 Perhaps it should be done away with altogether.5 4 While it is still
with us, however, and in the absence of a showing that the corporation erred
in crediting some items to its capital surplus account, 5 there is no reason why
the courts should not accept whatever help the corporate books can offer.
52. "The rule of the Osborne case was supposed to be simple and just; it proved to
be confusing and at times unjust." In the Matter of Hagen, 262 N.Y. 301, 305, 186 N.E.

792, 793 (1933).
53. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 17-a.
54. See Browning, Extraordinary Corporate Distributions Under the New York Law of
Trusts-A Reexamination of the Osborne Rule inthe Light of Experience, 4 Syracuse L.
Rev. 293 (1953).

55. 7 N.Y.2d at 13, 163 N.E.2d at 306, 194 N.Y.S.2d at 473.

